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Abstract
Intrusion detection is only a starting step in securing IT infrastructure. Prediction of intrusions
is the next step to provide an active defense against incoming attacks.
Most of the existing intrusion prediction methods mainly focus on prediction of either intrusion
type or intrusion category. Also, most of them are built based on domain knowledge and spe-
cific scenario knowledge. This thesis proposes an alert prediction framework which provides
more detailed information than just the intrusion type or category to initiate possible defensive
measures. The proposed algorithm is based on hidden Markov model and it does not depend
on specific domain knowledge. Instead, it depends on a training process. Hence the proposed
algorithm is adaptable to different conditions. Also, it is based on prediction of the next alert
cluster, which contains source IP address, destination IP range, alert type and alert category.
Hence, prediction of next alert cluster provides more information about future strategies of the
attacker.
Experiments were conducted using a public data set generated over 2500 alert predictions.
Proposed alert prediction framework achieved accuracy of 81% and 77% for single step and
five step predictions respectively for prediction of the next alert cluster. It also achieved an ac-
curacy of prediction of 95% and 92% for single step and five step predictions respectively for
prediction of the next alert category. The proposed methods achieved 5% prediction accuracy
improvement for alert category over variable length Markov based alert prediction method,
while providing more information for a possible defense.
Keywords: Feature Reduction, Hidden Markov Model, Intrusion Alerts, Intrusion Detec-
tion, Intrusion Response, Intrusion Prediction
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Human activities associated with computational devices are rapidly growing day by day. Nowa-
days most smart devices are capable of connecting to the internet. The world is becoming a
more connected place and people are heavily relying on services offered based on computer
networks. With such a high involvement with interconnected devices, sensitive and valuable
information are rapidly exchanging between computer networks and devices. On the other
hand, traditional networks, applications and protocols were developed in an era where security
was not a critical factor. Thus most of the networks, protocols and applications are vulnerable
to intrusions. In some cases, although systems were developed to work in a secure network
environment, due to rapid development, these systems needed to interconnect with other net-
works to provide new on-line services.
Devices with interconnection capabilities are growing rapidly in numbers. McAfee labs es-
timated that there will be 24.4 billion IP connected devices and 4 billion users in 2019 [1]. On
the other hand, network intrusions are growing rapidly and new attack vectors are continuously
being used to overcome security systems. Hence, deployment and continuous improvement of
network security systems are of paramount importance. Their presence attempts to secure the
network from intrusions and attacks and keeps the system operational to provide continuous
services to its users.
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An action or set of actions that compromises confidentiality, availability and integrity of a
computer system is defined as an intrusion [2]. Intrusion detection is defined as identification
of [3]:
• Users who attempt to use a computer system without authorization,
• Authorized users who are abusing their privileges.
Initially, most of the research activities were focused on intrusion detection methods. Such
intrusion detection systems identify the attacks that have already happened or currently hap-
pening in the network. To improve network security, advanced system models are required,
which are able to detect impending or ongoing intrusions and take countermeasures to stop
intrusion activities. Researchers are focusing on developing sophisticated Intrusion Response
System (IRS) to fulfill this requirement.
The main objectives of an Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) can be described as
1. Identification of ongoing and future intrusions,
2. Execute necessary prevention mechanisms to prevent ongoing and future intrusions,
3. Apply necessary precautions that make similar kind of intrusions less successful in the
future.
Prediction of future intrusion activities plays a key role in intrusion response, which helps in
identifying and executing response actions before an intrusion occurs. Intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) generate intrusion alerts once they detect network intrusions. An intrusion alert
is a record that contains important information about the intrusion, such as the origin, the vic-
tim, type of the intrusion and the time when the intrusion has been detected [4]. Multiple
intrusion alerts may be generated for a particular intrusion due to slight variations. As an ex-
ample, a “port scan” intrusion may produce two different types of intrusion alerts such as “TCP
Portscan” and “UDP Portscan” based on execution of the port scan. These alerts can then be
used as an input to intrusion response systems to understand attacker strategies and predict
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future network intrusions.
The general system architecture of intrusion response system is shown in Figure 1.1. It is a
modified version which was originally presented by Shameli et al. [5]. Alert Pre-processing
and intrusion analysis module integration to the intrusion response selection process is addi-
tionally proposed to the architecture presented by Shameli et al. [5]. IRS utilizes IDS alerts
as the main input source. IRS system architecture is mainly divided in to three modules: pre-
processing, intrusion analysis and intrusion response.
Figure 1.1: Architecture of intrusion response system.
1. Pre-processing module. Main input source of the IRS is IDS alerts. IRS received alerts
from different IDSs. Different IDSs generates alert in different formats and may con-
tain different attributes as well. In the first step, these alerts are formatted to a common
format which contains important alert attributes. Since there are different input sources,
redundant alerts may be present in the input. These redundant alerts are removed by the
pre-processing module. Generally, IDSs generate a high volume of alerts. It is impossi-
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ble to analyze these alerts individually and even if one were to do this, it may not produce
useful information. Techniques such as alert aggregation, clustering and verification are
employed to reduce large volume of alerts and group similar alerts together which makes
analysis much easier.
2. Intrusion analysis module. The main objective of intrusion analysis module is to gain
knowledge about current and future intrusion strategies of a would be attacker using
intrusion alerts. Then that knowledge is used to execute responses to prevent ongoing
and future intrusions. Intrusions Prediction methods can be mainly classified as,
• Attack graph based intrusions prediction. An attack graph represents attack se-
quence of multi-stage attack. Attack graph based intrusion prediction employs an
existing database of attack graphs for prediction. Based on the observed alert se-
quence the most suitable attack graph which matches observed intrusion sequence
is selected by alert prediction module. Future intrusions are then predicted by the
aid of the selected attack graph.
• Sequence modeling based intrusions prediction. Alerts generated by IDS is treated
as a sequential data series. Where current data point depends on previous data
point or previous data points. Observed sequential data series is used to model a
system in which that system represents the behavior of observed sequence. This
model learns the properties of the sequential data series. Once a certain sequence
of data points is observed, most probable next data point can be identified using this
model. In the context of alert prediction, a model is developed based on observed
alerts. This model represents the behavior of observed alert series. By using that
model, possible future alerts are predicted after a sequence of historical alerts were
observed.
IRS generates an attack plan based on detected intrusions and predicted intrusions. An
attack plan consists of sequence of attack steps. This attack plan contains attack steps
completed up to now and possible future attack steps. Based on that knowledge, IRS
selects suitable response actions to prevent current and future intrusions.
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3. Intrusion response module. Intrusion response module is the core of the intrusion re-
sponse system. The main purpose of intrusion response module is to select and execute
best response actions based on ongoing and predicted intrusions. Selecting a response is
a very complicated process. Main components of response selection module can be cat-
egorized as risk assessment module, response selection module and response execution
module [5].
• Risk assessment module. Risk assessment module assesses risk of ongoing or pre-
dicted intrusions to the network services and assets. Output of risk assessment
module is sent into response selection module.
• Response selection module. Response selection module is responsible for selecting
a response to an intrusion. The response selection methods can be mainly catego-
rized as static mapping, dynamic mapping and cost-sensitive methods [5].
• Response execution module. Response execution module is responsible for ex-
ecuting selected responses. Response execution can be categorized as proactive
response, immediate response and delayed response based on response execution
time [6], [7].
A detailed description about intrusion response systems is included in the section 2.2.
1.2 Alert Prediction in IDS
Most of existing intrusion response systems are operating in immediate response mode or de-
layed response mode. Where responses are executed immediately or after a specific time win-
dow of an intrusion detection. The major disadvantages of the immediate and delayed response
methods are shown below [5].
• Response applied once an intrusion actually occurred, hence it may be difficult or not
possible to revert back network to its original state.
• There is a possibility of spreading attacks through the network until it controls by the
response system.
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• It may take a time to revert back system to its original state (or healthy state) and system
services can be affected during that period. Also, the attacker has sufficient time to
execute more attacks until response is applied.
By considering these factors, it is beneficial to develop an IRS with proactive response capa-
bilities. Alert prediction in IDS plays a key role in developing intrusion response system with
proactive response capabilities. Let intrusion alerts observed in a specific time window be rep-
resented as A = A1, A2, . . . , At, . . . , AT . Intrusion alert prediction is defined as predicting a next
possible intrusion alert AT+1, given that the previously generated intrusion alert sequence A is
available.
Intrusion alert prediction can be mainly categorized as network attack graph based predic-
tion [8], [9], [10] and sequence modeling techniques (such as Markov model, Hidden Markov
model, Bayesian networks and Dynamic Programming) based prediction [11], [12], [13]. Se-
quence modeling techniques have been successfully implemented in fields such as biology
(DNA sequence) [14], speech pattern identification [15] and financial data forecasting [16].
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is one of the widely used sequential data modeling method.
The hidden Markov model is a stochastic model which was introduced in the late 1960s by
Baum and his colleagues [17], [18]. Due to rich mathematical structure of hidden Markov
model, it widely applied in real world applications such as speech recognition, handwriting
pattern recognition, gesture recognition, intrusion detection and speech tagging.
Intrusion alerts typically contains two fields that are used to identify an intrusion which caused
the corresponding intrusion alert. These fields are called “alert type” and “alert category.”
Alert type contains detailed information about an intrusion whereas alert category contains
higher level information about an intrusion. As an example “UDP Filtered Portsweep” and
“UDP Portsweep” alert types both belongs to “attempted-recon” alert category and the alert
type “UDP Filtered Portsweep” provides much more specific information than the alert cate-
gory “attempted-recon.”
Most of the previous intrusion prediction methods were mainly focused on prediction of ei-
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ther alert type or alert category. A proper response action cannot be executed by only knowing
future intrusion type or intrusion category. In order to execute useful response action, it is
important to predict other important parameters such as who is the attacker (attacker IP ad-
dress) and who is the victim of the attack (victim IP address). Then response action can be
executed to specific network segment without applying response action to the whole network.
Also, response action can be targeted specifically to the attacker. The behavior of attackers
are depending on many factors such as network topology, operating systems running on hosts,
services running on the network and geographical location of networks, etc. Therefore, predic-
tion module should be able to adapt different conditions and networks. If prediction module
heavily depends on domain knowledge and specific scenario knowledge (such as attack graphs
based prediction methods) whereas such a kind of prediction modules will not be able to adapt
to different conditions. Hence it is important to develop an alert prediction module which is
capable of operating under different conditions and networks.
1.3 Contributions
The objective of this research is to develop an alert prediction module based on hidden Markov
models.
Key contributions include:
1. Investigation of feature reduction on the performance of intrusion detection based on an
existing data set containing network intrusions.
2. An algorithm for predicting the next intrusion alert, given a sequence of intrusion alerts
from an existing IDS tool such as ”Snort”.
3. Comparison of the proposed alert prediction algorithm against existing prediction algo-
rithms which shows comparable accuracy while providing additional information for a
possible response.
4. A software module which implements the proposed alert prediction algorithm.
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Block diagram of the proposed alert prediction framework is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Block diagram of the proposed alert prediction framework.
1.4 Document Structure
The content of this thesis organized as follows:
Chapter 2 consists of a literature survey of intrusion alert prediction research area. It describes
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an overview of intrusion detection methods and intrusion response methods. Also, this chapter
includes a detailed description of alert prediction research activities.
Chapter 3 describes usage of feature reduction techniques such as Information Gain and Chi-
Squared statistics to improve intrusion detection capabilities of Random Forest, Random Tree,
Adaboost, J48 decision tree and OneR machine learning techniques.
Also, this chapter describes alert prediction process in detail, which includes the Bag of Words
(BoW) model based k-means alert clustering process and implementation of hidden Markov
model for alert prediction. Also, this chapter discusses software and programming language
use in implementation of alert prediction module.
Chapter 4 includes the results of intrusion detection performance evaluation of Adaboost, Ran-
dom Forest, Random Tree, J48 and OneR machine learning techniques with Information Gain
and Chi-Squared statistics feature reduction techniques.
Also, this chapter discusses performance evaluation of proposed alert prediction method with
respect to the number of clusters and hidden Markov model parameters. It also compares pre-
diction accuracy of alert cluster based sequence modeling and alert category based sequence
modeling.
Chapter 5 includes critical analysis of results and challenges involve in the alert prediction
process. This chapter also discusses possible basic intrusion response actions that can be im-
plemented based on output of proposed prediction system. It also includes recommended im-
provements for proposed system.
Chapter 2
Background
In the early days, when a network intrusion is detected by intrusion detection systems, it notifies
the incident to the system administrator to take further actions. However, this process can be
delayed due to reasons such as lack of availability of human experts in real time. As a solution
for this, researchers are interested in developing automated Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs)
which are capable executing responses automatically without human involvement. However,
executing a response to an intrusion that has already happened, or currently happening in the
network requires developing an IRS with prediction capabilities that is capable of preventing
ongoing and future intrusions.
Within the broader area of network security research, there are many research activities that
aim to improve intrusion detection, prediction and response. This chapter summarizes intru-
sion detection, prediction and response. Section 2.1 describes intrusion detection methods in
general and section 2.2 describes intrusion response methods. Alert processing and prediction
are described in more detail in section 2.3.
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) generate alerts once they detect intrusion activities. These
alerts can be used as an input to intrusion response systems to understand strategies of an
attacker and predict future intrusion activities. Typical network security intrusion detection
10
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methods can be classified as misuse based detection, anomaly based detection (behavior based
detection) or a combination of misuse based and anomaly based [19], [20].
Misuse based detection mechanisms compare network packet flow with known malicious threats
patterns. If a pattern is matched, it is identified as an intrusion [21], [22]. Advantages of mis-
use based intrusion detection are higher accuracy and easy implementation. Inability to detect
unknown intrusions and requirement of regular pattern database updates are the main disad-
vantages of misuse based detection.
Anomaly detection is based on the behavior of the system/user. The behavior of the system
is classified as a normal operation or abnormal operation mode based on measurements of
system parameters and characteristics such as bandwidth utilization of services, protocols that
used in the system, ports involved and transaction rates of services [23], [24]. The main advan-
tage of behavior based detection is that it is capable of identifying unknown attacks. The main
disadvantage is lower accuracy.
2.1.1 Classification of Intrusion Detection Techniques
Intrusion detection approaches can be categorized as below [25], [26]:
1. Knowledge based systems. Knowledge based intrusion detection system contains infor-
mation about known attacks and vulnerabilities. The knowledge base is utilized to iden-
tify possible attacks on the network. The simplest knowledge based detection is pattern
matching based intrusion detection [27], [28]. State transition based detection [29], [30],
expert systems [31], [32] and logic based detection are other knowledge based intrusion
detection systems.
2. Statistical methods. Network attribute values are measured over a time and behaviors
of the system are classified based on statistical properties of these attributes, common
attributes include CPU usage, memory usage, network usage, number of user logins,
number of logout requests, number of active tcp connections, etc. During normal opera-
tion, these attributes will be in a certain range. During an abnormal operation they may
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diverge from their normal range, which are used to identify intrusions [33], [34], [35].
The main advantage of statistical models is that it can identify unknown attacks. The
main disadvantage of statistical methods is the need to monitor a system over long time
period to accurately model the system.
3. Protocol analysis. Protocol analysis looks for misuse or incorrect use of protocols to
detect security attacks [36], [37], [38]. Normal behaviors of the system are modeled
based on protocol usage analysis. If the protocol usage is different from normal behavior,
the state of the system is identified as abnormal.
4. Soft computing and classification based methods. Soft computing methods are used to
solve problems when available information is insufficient. Different soft computing and
machine learning methods have been proposed for intrusion detection. Artificial Neural
Network based systems (ANNs) [39], [40], Fuzzy Logic (FL) based systems [41], [42],
[43], Genetic Algorithms (GAs) based systems [42], [44], Artificial Immune Systems
[45], [46], [47], Probabilistic Reasoning (PR) based systems and Ant Colony Algorithms
based systems [48], [49] are most popular soft computing methods that are used in net-
work security domain.
Classification and clustering group similar kind of objects together and as a result of
that, it is possible to identify different types of objects or behaviors. Classification meth-
ods such as Support Vector Machine (SVMs) and K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm (KNN)
are most popular classification methods those are used in intrusion detection [50], [51],
[52]. Advantages of soft computing and classification based methods are the ability to
work with incomplete information as well as the ability of detecting unknown attacks.
Over-fitting and more time consumption during the training process are the main disad-
vantages of soft computing and classification based methods.
5. Hybrid methods. Hybrid methods combine two or more intrusion detection methods or
techniques. The intrusion detection system assigns weights for each method or tech-
niques and combines the result of individual methods to calculate the final result. As an
example, the detection system may employ two classification techniques to classify the
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data and combines results of two classification technique to get the final result [53], [54].
Also, intrusion detection system may combine two different methods such as knowledge-
based detection methods and behavior-based detection methods to develop a hybrid de-
tection system [55], [56], [57]. The main disadvantage of hybrid methods is higher
computational cost compared to individual methods.
There is a possibility that intrusion detection systems detect normal behavior of the system as
abnormal and conversely abnormal as normal. These two events are referred as a false alarm
and a missed detection respectively. Also, it is possible that IDSs fail to identify exact intrusion
type even they identified it is as an intrusion activity, this is referred as a detected attack. An
actual intrusion that correctly identified by IDS as an intrusion with correct intrusion type is
referred as a true alarm. False alarms and missed detections should be minimized to accomplish
better result in intrusion response process [7].
2.1.2 Data Reduction Techniques to Improve Intrusion Detection
IDSs collect network data captured by sensors and sniffers for intrusion detection purposes.
Typically network sensors produce a larger amount of data even for a small network. Also,
network packet capture contains many attributes (features) such as source IP address, desti-
nation IP address, packet frame length, packet data length, etc. It is impossible to analyze all
these features and even if one were to do this, it increases computational cost of the IDS. There-
fore, it is important to identify the best features that efficiently contribute to intrusion detection
process. Sensor data reduction methods can be broadly categorized as following [54]:
• Data filtering. Data filtering is used to reduce the amount of sensor data that is processed
by IDSs. Unwanted data captured by sensors are filtered by the filtering process. As an
example, IDS can filter out some data based on human expert analysis (such as log files
and partially captured data). Filtering process helps to improve detection accuracy and
decrease storage requirement. Data filtering should be done with carefully, otherwise
useful data can be filtered out.
• Feature selection. It is important to identify the relationship of features to intrusion
detection. Some features may contain redundant information and some features may
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actually not contain any useful information relevant to intrusion detection. With increase
of features, processing time of IDS may increase as well. Therefore, it is important
to identify features that mostly contribute to intrusion detection and it helps to develop
efficient and accurate IDS.
• Data clustering. Data clustering groups similar kind of objects together and as a result of
that, it can be used as a data reduction method. Also, it reduces processing and analyzing
cost of data, because clustered data can be analyzed and processed instead of individual
data.
Feature selection methods can be mainly classified as filter-based methods and wrapper-based
methods [58]. Although filter-based methods have better efficiency when compared with
wrapper-based methods, wrapper-based methods are shown to have better accuracy than filter-
based methods [59].
1. Filter-based feature selection methods. Filter-based feature selection methods evaluate
features by inspecting inherent properties of the data. Filter-based feature selection is a
pre-processing step and it is independent from induction algorithm (classification algo-
rithm) [58]. Filter based methods apply statistical tests to the features to identify which
features are mostly correlated to the output. It calculates a score for each feature and
features with a higher score are more correlated to the output. Advantages of filter-based
feature selection methods are following [60]:
• Scalable, can be applied to large feature set and large datasets,
• Independent from classification algorithm. Therefore, selected features can be ap-
plied to different classification algorithms,
• Computationally less expensive.
Information Gain (IG) [61], Relief algorithm [62], Chi-squared test [61], Markov Blanket
Filter (MBF) [63] and Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) [64] are some filter-
based feature selection methods.
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2. Wrapper-based feature selection methods. Wrapper-based feature selection methods
evaluate different subset of features using induction algorithm [58]. Wrapper-based
method prepares different combination of feature sets from original feature set. Then
feature sets are evaluated by adding and removing features to find the best feature set
using an induction algorithm. The main advantages of wrapper-based feature selection
methods are higher accuracy and ability to select the best feature set [59]. Higher com-
putational cost and being dependent on the induction algorithm are main disadvantages
of this method [60].
2.1.3 Datasets for Training, Testing and Evaluation of Intrusion
Detection
Although real time intrusion detection is an important feature of an intrusion detection system,
oﬄine mode operation provides many opportunities. For research, oﬄine mode provides op-
portunity for in depth analysis of patterns and behaviors of intrusions. In addition to that, it
provides opportunity for in depth testing of intrusion detection algorithms. In operational point
of view, oﬄine mode provides in depth analysis of past data and generates prevention methods
for future occurrences.
Networks generate different traffic patterns based on their behavior and network elements gen-
erate alerts, logs, alarms and warnings if they detect an abnormal behavior. These two types
of data are used to identify the abnormal behaviors of the networks. The network data can
be generated using two main methods a) capturing real network data and b) generating data
by simulation. These generated network data is used to develop intrusion datasets. Intrusion
datasets provide an opportunity for in-depth analysis of patterns, behaviors of intrusions and
testing of intrusion detection algorithms oﬄine. Intrusion dataset can be mainly categorized as
[25]:
1. Real network dataset. Real network dataset includes data captured from real networks
over few days. The captured data include normal and abnormal behaviors of the network.
Famous real network datasets are UNIBS dataset [65] and ISCX−UNB dataset [66].
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2. Benchmark dataset. Benchmark dataset is generated by simulated environments in large
network. Simulated environment generates different intrusion scenarios. The most popu-
lar and widely used benchmark dataset is KDDcup99 dataset [67]. Other famous datasets
are NSL-KDD dataset [68], DARPA dataset [69], UNSW-NB15 dataset [70], LBNL-
ICSI dataset [71] and CAIDA dataset [72] are famous benchmark datasets.
3. Synthetic dataset. Synthetic dataset is generated to meet a specific requirement. Syn-
thetic dataset is usually used to evaluate the system prototype theoretically.
In this thesis, two datasets were used for the experiments. The Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset
(AWID) [73] was used for the performance evaluation of OneR, Adaboost, J48 decision tree,
Random Forest and Random Tree machine learning techniques based intrusion detection with
feature reduction. The DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) [69] dataset
was used for the performance evaluation of proposed alert prediction framework.
2.2 Intrusion Response Systems
Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) mainly utilize alerts generated by the Intrusion Detection
Systems to gain knowledge about ongoing and impending intrusions. Typically, most of the
IDSs generate a large amount of alerts during their operation. These alerts must be utilized
efficiently to gain knowledge about intrusions. Mechanism such as alert aggregation [74],
[75], [76], alert correlation [77], [78], [79], [80] and alert prediction [8], [11], [12], [81] are
proposed to improve utilization of IDS alerts and gain knowledge about ongoing and impending
intrusions using IDS alerts.
2.2.1 Intrusion Response System Classification
The following section describes classification of intrusion response systems which is mainly
based on studies done by Shameli et al. [5] and Stakhanova et al. [82]. The classification of
intrusion response systems is shown in Figure 2.1 which is generated based on studies done by
Shameli et al. [5] and Stakhanova et al. [82].
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Figure 2.1: Classification of intrusion response systems which is generated based on studies
done by Shameli et al. [5] and Stakhanova et al. [82]
1. Classification based on automation. Notification systems, manual response systems and
automated response systems are the main categories of IRS when they are classified
based on their degree of automation.
• Notification response systems. The intrusion response systems identify intrusion
activities and then IRS notifies to other systems or system administrator to perform
further actions.
• Manual response systems. Manual response systems have pre-configured action
sets based on the type of the intrusion. When the system detects an intrusion, it
prompts these pre-configured action sets to the system administrator to execute.
• Automated response systems. Automated response systems operate without human
intervention. The system applies necessary prevention actions automatically when
it detects an intrusion or identifies an intrusion in progress or predicts an intrusion.
2. Classification based on response methods. Passive response methods and active response
methods are the main categories of IRS when they are classified based on their on re-
sponse methods.
• Passive response methods. Once an intrusion is detected or predicted, the response
system informs it to other parties and relies on their actions.
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• Active response methods. Response system itself takes actions to stop or minimize
impact of security threats.
Active response execution has a major impact on intrusion prevention and running con-
dition of the system. Time of a response execution and response execution sequence are
major characteristics of active response implementation. Response mechanism can be
categorized as proactive response, immediate response and delayed response based on
response execution time [6], [7].
• Proactive response mode. Response actions are taken before an intrusion happen.
• Immediate response mode. Response actions are taken immediately once an intru-
sion is detected.
• Delayed response mode. Response actions are taken after a specific time window
of an intrusion detection.
Most of the existing intrusion response systems are operating in immediate response
mode or delayed response mode. The major disadvantages of the immediate and delayed
response methods are described below [5].
• Responses are applied once an intrusion actually occurred, hence it may be difficult
or not possible to revert back network to its original state.
• There is a possibility of spreading an attack through the network until it is controlled
by the response system.
• It may take a time to revert back system to its original state (or healthy state).
System services can be affected during that period. Also, an attacker has sufficient
time to execute more attacks until a response is applied.
3. Classification based on response execution methods. Response execution can be mainly
categorized as burst executions or retroactive executions.
• Burst executions. All actions are executed once an intrusion is detected. IRS does
not analyze the impact on each individual action. The main disadvantage of burst
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executions is that it has a higher operation cost in some cases. Most of the times
lesser number of actions may be sufficient to prevent an intrusion.
• Retroactive execution. An initial set of response actions are executed and risk of
the intrusion to the network is evaluated before executing further response actions.
Based on risk of the intrusion the need to execute any further actions are identified.
4. Classification based on adaptability. Intrusion response systems can be categorized as
non-adaptive (static) and adaptive (dynamic) based on their response behavior.
5. Classification based on response selection methods. The response selection method is
one key property that determines the adaptability of intrusion response systems. The re-
sponse selection methods can be mainly categorized as static mapping, dynamic mapping
and cost-sensitive methods.
• The static response selection is the simplest response selection method where an
intrusion is statically mapped to a particular response or set of responses [83]. Usu-
ally, these kinds of systems are easy to build and maintain. On the other hand,
their responses are easy to predict and therefore, real-world intrusions may adapt
to evade such preventive measures. Additionally, it does not consider risk level
of the intrusion to the network in the response selection process, which is another
weakness of static response selection.
• Dynamic response mapping systems select responses dynamically based on char-
acteristics of an intrusion. Each specific intrusion has a set of responses that are
assigned to it. Responses are dynamically selected by the intrusion response sys-
tem, based on intrusion matrices (which are built based on intrusion characteristics
such as intrusion severity and intrusion frequency) [84], [85].
• Cost sensitive response selection methods select responses based on the damage
cost of intrusion and cost of the response [86], [87]. Response action also has a
cost, in some scenarios cost of executing response action is higher than the cost of
the intrusions. In such a situation it is worth to keep the system with intrusion than
executing response action. As an example consider Daniel of Service attack (DoS)
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where an attacker floods useless traffic to degrade network services. In some cases,
response action used to mitigate DoS attack may degrade network performance
than DoS attack.
2.3 Alert Processing
The main objective of alert processing in an IDS is to gain knowledge about the current security
status of the system and predict possible intrusion activities that can happen in the future.
This section describes the overview of alert processing which includes alert aggregation, alert
correlation and alert prediction.
• Alert pre-processing. The main objective of alert pre-processing is to remove redundant
alerts that are received. The response systems may receive alerts from multiple intru-
sion detection systems. Since there are different input sources, redundant alerts may be
present in the input. The first step of pre-processing is to format raw alerts from different
IDSs to a common format and then duplicated alerts are removed using selected fea-
tures. Typical features that are used to eliminate duplicate records are timestamp of the
alert, source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, signature
of the alert (alert type) and signature class of the alert (alert category). Once duplication
removal process is completed, then these alerts are used in the analysis process.
• Alert fusion, aggregation and clustering. Typically, IDS produces a large number of
alerts. It is impossible to analyze these alerts individually and even if one were to do
this, it may not produce useful information. Alert fusion, aggregation and clustering
is a process which combines similar type of alerts together which makes analysis much
easier with much more useful information. Alert clustering can be done in many different
ways such as combining all alerts with same attributes (except time stamp) [81], [88] or
grouping alerts with same alert type within a predefined time period [89].
• Alert correlation and Alert prediction. Alert correlation provides the relationship of alerts
which is generated due to intrusions. By analyzing alert correlation, it is possible to iden-
tify strategies and plans of the attacker which can be used to predict possible future in-
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trusion actions. During last few years many alerts correlation techniques were proposed.
These correlation techniques can be classified as following [90]:
1. Alert correlation based on feature similarity. Alert correlation is done based on feature
similarities of the alerts. Features such as source address, destination address, source
port, destination port and alert type are used for correlation.
2. Alert correlation based on known scenarios. Correlation of alerts is defined based on
known intrusion scenarios. The knowledge about the intrusion scenarios are stored as
an attack graph or specified in attack languages (such as LAMBDA [91], ADeLe [92]).
But the limitation of this method is it can only correlate alerts based on knowledge base
availability.
3. Alert correlation based on preconditions and consequence. Early stage activities of an
attacker have an impact on his later activities. If early stage steps are successful then
later stage steps are more probable to execute and succeed. By analyzing pre intrusion
activities sequence it is possible to predict possible post activities.
2.3.1 Intrusion Activities Prediction
Prediction of future intrusion activities based on observed intrusion activities is very challeng-
ing. Observed IDS alerts can be used to predict possible future intrusion activities. Intrusion
activity prediction can be mainly classified as:
• Attack graph based intrusion activity prediction,
• Sequence modeling based intrusion activity prediction.
Attack Graph Based Intrusion Activity Prediction
An attack graph is one of the most commonly used method in network security analysis. An
attack graph represents possible intrusion sequence of multi-stage attack. Consider a network
present in [93] which consists of file server (host 1) and database server (host 2). The host 1
offers File Transfer Protocol (ftp), Remote Shell (rsh) and Secure Shell (ssh) services. The host
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2 offers ftp and rsh services and firewall allows ftp, rsh and ssh traffic between host 0 to host 1
and host 2. One possible attack sequence for this network can be described as [93]:
1. Step 1. Attacker executes ssh buffer overflow exploit from host 0 to host 1.
2. Step 2. Attacker gets access to the host 1 and executes arbitrary codes on host 1.
3. Step 3. Attacker uploads a list of trusted hosts to the host 2 using ftp vulnerability.
4. Step 4. Attacker remotely executes shell commands on host 2.
5. Step 5. Attacker gains the root privilege of host 2 by using a local buffer overflow exploit
on host 2.
The attack graph represents possible attack sequence. Hence, these attack graphs can be used
to predict possible future attack activities once initial steps were observed.
Attack Graph Based Alert Prediction Research Activities
Qin and Lee proposed attack projection scheme based on probabilistic reasoning method [81].
They used attack tree to develop Bayesian network. The Bayesian network is represented as
a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with each node of the graph represents a variable which has
a certain set of states and directed edges represent the relationship between variables. They
represented the root node as the main goal of the attacker and leaf nodes as sub-goals of the
attacker. The prior probability of parent nodes status and a set of conditional probability as-
sociated with child nodes are two main parameters of the Bayesian networks. They evaluated
the likelihood of the goal and sub-goals based on observed intrusion activities and used this
knowledge to predict possible future intrusion activities. The main limitation of this process is
prediction depends on the availability of an attack plan library. Also, it requires mapping best
possible attack graph for a given observation scenario.
Similar to the method proposed by Qin and Lee, Ramki et al. proposed Bayesian network
based directed acyclic graph (DAG) aided alert prediction method [89] where they evaluated
the correlation between alert types. Based on correlation and generated attack graph, they pre-
dicted next possible alert type that can occur. They used the DARPA2000 dataset [69] for their
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alert type prediction.
Li et al. [8] proposed attack graph based intrusion prediction method. They used associa-
tion rule mining to generate attack graphs. They examined the relationship between alerts to
generate the attack graph. This attack graph represents an ordered sequence of attack steps with
a predictability score from one step to another. By observing the attack graph, it is possible to
predict possible future steps once several initial steps are observed. They used the DARPA1999
[69] and DARPA2000 [69] datasets for their experiments.
Multi-stage attack forecasts based on probabilistic matching was proposed by Cheng et al.
where prediction of attack steps were done by measuring the difference between the stored and
the actual multi-stage attack session graphs (ASG) [94]. Their method was inspired by the
generalized Hough transform and polygonal curves mapping concept was used to find similar-
ities between stored attack graphs and ongoing attack. Probabilistic mapping does not require
exact mapping, therefore, this method performs better when it compare with exact mapping
techniques such as Longest Common Sub-sequence (LCS) algorithm. They used a mapping
which assign a number to an alert attribute based on attribute value range or condition. Then
these numeric values of attributes are used to convert an intrusion alert to an ID. Attack session
graphs were generated by using alert ID as a y value and corresponding time stamp as x value.
They used the DARPA2000 dataset [69] for their experiments. The major limitation of this
method is that prediction depends on the availability of an attack graph library.
Lippmann et al. analyzed attack graph generation methods proposed by various researchers
and illustrated that most of these graph generation involved network with less than 20 nodes
and most of them had poor capability of scaling [95]. This finding indicates that intrusion
activity prediction methods propose based on attack graphs are not very feasible to employ in
practice due to scaling issues.
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Sequence Modeling Based Intrusion Activity Prediction
Sequence modeling techniques are successfully implemented in fields such as biology (DNA
sequence) [14], [96], speech pattern identification [15], [97] and financial data forecasting [16],
[98]. Sequential data can be defined as finite set of symbols appear in a sequential manner, as
an example, we can consider A, B, E, G, T as a set of symbols, then few sequence data pattern
can be represented as
Pattern 1 = A, E, G, E, B, T, A, A, G.
Pattern 2 = G, E, B, T, B, A, B, A, B.
Pattern 3 = T, A, A, G, E, B, A, A, G.
By studying symbol generation patterns, a model can be developed. This model represents
characteristics of observed symbol pattern. This model can be used to identify desired symbol
output (i.e. validating observed output) and predict future outcomes. When we think about the
cyber domain, we can apply above properties to detect intrusion activities and predict possible
intrusion activities. As an example, by observing above three patterns it can be seen that G,
E, B, T and T, A, A, G are common sequence of patterns. If G, E, B pattern is observed
and then we can predict T as a next possible symbol with higher probability compared to the
other symbols. Markov model and hidden Markov model are widely used models for sequence
modeling [96], [99].
Markov Model
Consider a source that generates one symbol at a time from the alphabet S = {A, T, E, D, M} as
shown in Figure 2.2. N th order Markov model assigns a probability estimation of a symbols of
the alphabet based on “N” number of previous symbols outcomes. Let outcome symbol at
time = t represents as Xt then outcome at time = t+1 (Xt+1) depends on Xt+1−N , . . . , Xt−1, Xt
previous observations.
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Figure 2.2: Symbol sequence generated by Markov model.
Hidden Markov Model
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is stochastic model which was introduced in late 1960s
by Baum and his colleagues [17], [18]. Due to rich mathematical structure, hidden Markov
models are widely applied in real world applications such as speech recognition, handwriting
recognition, gesture recognition, intrusion detection, speech tagging and bioinformatics.
A hidden Markov model is used to model sequential of observations that can be observed
over the time. Also there are underlying state sequences which are not observed, that produce
these observations. These states are defined as hidden states. As an example, we can consider
rainy, cloudy, stormy and sunny as observations and high, medium and low atmospheric pres-
sure as hidden states which we cannot observe. Figure A.1 shows an example of hidden state
and corresponding observation sequence for weather condition of six consecutive days.
A detailed description about the hidden Markov model is included in the appendix A.
Figure 2.3: An example of hidden state and corresponding observation sequence for weather
condition of six consecutive days.
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Sequence Modeling Based Intrusion Activity Prediction Research Activities
The following section describes research activities for step prediction of attack based on se-
quential modeling techniques such as Markov model and hidden Markov model.
Fava et al. [11] proposed alert prediction method based on sequence modeling. Their method
is based on Variable Length Markov Model. Markov model assigns a probability to a symbol
based on their appearance in the sequence. In N th order Markov model, probability of a symbol
appearance depends on “N” number of previous observations. The main design challenge of
applying sequence modeling for alert prediction is definition of symbols, because symbols are
used to build data sequence. Individual alert has many attributes, therefore it is required to de-
cide which attributes are used and how many attributes are selected? They have selected three
alert attributes namely alert category, alert description and destination IP address of an alert as
symbols in the Markov model and generated three different Markov models for alert category,
alert description and destination IP address. Using these models, they predicted the next alert
category, next alert description and destination IP address separately.
They defined prediction accuracy as the percentage of correctly predicted symbols over a to-
tal number of predictions. They used three accuracy values as top 1, top 2 and top 3. Top
1 accuracy means accuracy of most probable symbol predicted by the model. Top 2 accuracy
means accuracy of occurring one of two most probable symbol predicted by the model as a next
symbol. Top 3 accuracy means accuracy of occurrence of one of three most probable symbol
predicted by the model as a next symbol. They evaluated their method using an in-house de-
veloped data set where 50% of data is used for Markov model training and other 50% is used
for the testing. They have achieved 90% top3 accuracy for predicting next alert category and
70% for predicting next alert type.
One main limitation of their method is that they are predicting alert type, alert category and
destination IP separately. So there are possibilities that combination of these three may not
be a valid combination. As an example, the predicted alert category is “Intrusion Root” and
predicted alert description is “ICMP PING NMAP”. However, predicted alert description does
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not belong to the predicted alert category. To address this limitation, Du et al. [12] presented an
ensemble techniques based alert attribute combination method. Based on ensemble techniques,
they have a proposed method to convert VMM alert prediction output to a score with respect
to the host of the network. This score is used to predict next possible host that can be attacked.
Major limitation of their method is that they have only interested to predict next host without
predicting attack type.
Kholidy et al. proposed a hidden Markov model based online risk assessment and predic-
tion models [100] with four system states. They defined the four system states as Hale(H):
System operation is normal, Investigate (I): Malicious activities are attempted, Attack (A): In-
trusion has been started and it is now progressing and Penetrate (P): Intrusion has successfully
compromised the system. These four states are defined as hidden states of the system and
alerts generated by the IDS are defined as the observation for hidden Markov model. They
used DARPA 2000 dataset [69] to simulate their risk prediction algorithm which contains five
major attack steps.
They have considered that, if the probability of the penetration state is higher than a threshold
of 80% then there is a possibility of an intrusion activity in the future. Using this concept they
were able to identify attack steps present in DARPA 2000 dataset before they actually occur.
Chapter 3
Methodology
Alerts generated by intrusion detection systems are used by intrusion response systems to gain
knowledge about current and impending intrusions. There is a possibility that intrusion detec-
tion systems detect normal activities as intrusions and conversely intrusions as normal activi-
ties. These inaccurate detections should be minimized to accomplish better result in intrusion
response process. Therefore, it is beneficial to develop accurate and efficient intrusion de-
tection system. Network packet capture contains many attributes such as source IP address,
destination IP address, packet frame length, packet data length, etc. In order to develop an
efficient and accurate IDS, it is necessary to identify attributes which have a significant impact
on identifying network intrusions. Section 3.1 presents the methodology used in identifying
important attributes.
The ability to predict an intrusion is a key property for any intrusion response system that aims
to block or impede an anticipated intrusion. Alert prediction plays a key role in developing
intrusion response system with these capabilities. Sections 3.2 to 3.5 present the methodol-
ogy used in the proposed alert prediction framework. Section 3.2 describes the overview of
proposed alert prediction model. Section 3.3 talks about the alert pre-processing and the alert
clustering process. Section 3.4 describes the implementation of hidden Markov model based
alert prediction framework. Section 3.5 talks about the software and programming language
use for the implementation.
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3.1 Machine Learning Techniques for Intrusion Detection
on Public Dataset with Feature Reduction
In this section, evaluation of different machine learning techniques based intrusion detection
with feature reduction techniques is discussed. With better feature identification, it is possible
to develop an efficient intrusion detection system. Feature reduction techniques such as Infor-
mation Gain (IG) and Chi-Squared statistics (CH) were applied to evaluate intrusion detection
performance of OneR, Adaboost, J48 decision tree, Random Forest and Random Tree machine
learning techniques with feature reduction.
There are a number of studies that have used older datasets such as KDDCUP 99 [67], NSLKDD
[68] and many researchers indicate that these datasets are outdated now [101], [102]. Hence, it
is important to evaluate new dataset such as Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) [73].
3.1.1 Machine Learning Techniques for Intrusion Detection
Machine learning is a process of knowledge discovery of data without being explicitly pro-
grammed. Machine learning techniques are becoming popular in last decade and used in many
day to day applications such as image recognition, natural language processing, spam detec-
tion, intrusion detection, search engine application, fault prediction and stock market analysis.
Machine learning techniques can be mainly categorized based on their learning method as a)
supervised learning, b) unsupervised learning and c) reinforcement learning.
1. Supervised learning. Learning process is done using labeled data. For a given input data
entry desired output is known (output is labeled). Algorithm learns by comparing its
output and desired output.
2. Unsupervised learning. This method is used when historical data labels are not available
for training (desired output is not available). Algorithm finds structure of input data
itself.
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3. Reinforcement learning. Algorithm performs various actions to achieve certain goals
and learns effectiveness of actions based on rewards received in a dynamic environment
For evaluation of machine learning based intrusion detection capabilities Adaboost, Random
Forest, Random Tree, J48(C4.5) and OneR supervised machine learning techniques were used
in this thesis.
1. Random Forest. Proper introduction of Random Forest algorithm is done by Leo Breiman
in 2001 [103]. Random Forest is multiple decision tree based machine learning algo-
rithm. It generates many classification trees and in order to classify new input, it applies
input vector to each of the trees in the forest and then selects class that most of trees
produced [103]. Random Forest algorithm has significant advantages such as it runs effi-
ciently on large data sets and it can handle many input variables, furthermore it efficiently
handles large percentage of missing data while maintaining accuracy [104].
2. Random Tree. Random Tree is a tree based classification algorithms. It employs a single
tree for data classification and it uses randomly selected number of attributes (say K) at
each node of the tree for the classification [105].
3. C4.5 (J48). C4.5 is a decision tree based classification algorithm introduced by Ross
Quinlan [106]. It is a successor of Iterative Dichotomiser 3 (ID3) algorithm which was
also developed by Ross Quinlan [107]. J48 is an open source Java implementation of the
C4.5 algorithm. C4.5 algorithm employs normalized information gain to split attributes
of the input data.
4. OneR. OneR is a rule based classification algorithm introduced by R.C. Holte in 1993
[108]. It is a very simple classification algorithm based on single rule (1-level decision
tree). OneR ranks attributes of training dataset using error rate and selects most infor-
mative attribute to develop a rule that predicts class of the data. The OneR algorithm
requires discrete attributes. If not, they are discretized.
5. Adaboost. Adaboost is a boosting machine learning algorithm introduced by Yoav Fre-
und and Robert Schapire [109]. Adaboost algorithm is used to improve the performance
of other learning algorithms by combining many relatively weak and inaccurate rules
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generated by other learning algorithms. These other learning algorithms are referred to
as weak learners or base learner components. The weak learner is used to generate a
hypothesis for each sample in training dataset. Adaboost combines weak hypotheses
generated by weak learners in many rounds to generate improved hypothesis [110].
3.1.2 Feature Reduction Process
In this thesis, Adaboost, Random Forest, Random Tree, J48(C4.5) and OneR supervised ma-
chine learning algorithms based intrusion detection techniques were evaluated. For training
and testing, Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) [73] dataset was used. The Aegean Wi-Fi
intrusion dataset includes separate datasets for training and testing. The training dataset was
used to train machine learning techniques and corresponding testing dataset was used to eval-
uate performance of machine learning techniques.
Each record of the AWID dataset includes 155 attributes with the class attribute. The class
attribute of a record is referred to a type of intrusion or normal network activity that corre-
sponding record is belong to. Each attribute of a record except the class attribute is considered
as a feature during the feature reduction process. The features include in the AWID datasets
are shown in table B.2.
The experimental setup that was used in this thesis is shown in Figure 3.1. Experiments were
conducted in two phases. In the first phase, performance evaluation of OneR, Adaboost, J48
decision tree, Random Forest and Random Tree machine learning techniques were evaluated
without applying any feature reduction as shown in Figure 3.1 (a). In the second phase, in-
formation gain and chi-squared test feature reduction techniques were applied to identify im-
portant features. Based on that less important features were removed from testing and training
datasets. These datasets with reduced feature set were used in the second phase to evaluate
intrusion detection capabilities of machine learning techniques as shown in Figure 3.1 (b).
Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [111] machine learning toolkit was
used to perform experiments.
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Figure 3.1: Machine learning techniques for intrusion detection with feature reduction.
The following sections describe the implementation of hidden Markov model based alert pre-
diction framework in detail.
3.2. Alert Prediction Module Architecture 33
3.2 Alert Prediction Module Architecture
One of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate how alerts produced by intrusion detec-
tion system is used to understand attack strategies and predict possible future activities of the
attacker. The proposed alert prediction module consists of three main modules namely alert
pre-processing module, alert clustering module and alert prediction module as shown in Figure
3.2. Output of the alert prediction module is forwarded into intrusion response module. The
response module is an external module from the proposed alert prediction framework.
Figure 3.2: Proposed hidden Markov model based alert prediction module.
In this thesis, sequential data modeling concept was employed to predict next possible intrusion
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alert for a given historical alert sequence. Hidden Markov model was used as sequential data
modeling method. To build a sequential data series in network security domain, alert clustering
concept was used. Intrusion alerts were clustered based on their feature similarities and then
for a given sequence of alerts, alert clustering module produced a sequence of clusters. Those
sequence of clusters were considered to build a sequential data series in our model. The hidden
Markov model is used to predict next cluster using the sequence data series which was built in
previous step. Since predicted cluster represents certain characteristics of alert attributes, that
information can be used by intrusion response module to select and execute relevant response
actions to mitigate future intrusions.
3.3 Alert Pre-Processing and Clustering
Intrusion alerts generated by intrusion detection systems (IDSs) was utilized by the proposed
alert prediction framework. In this thesis, Snort was used as an intrusion detection system
[112]. Snort is an open-source network intrusion detection system (NIDS) [112] which uses
a signature based intrusion detection system and it employs rule set for intrusion detection. If
the criteria mentioned in a rule is matched, then alert is produced for that condition by Snort.
Snort rules consist of two main parts namely rule header and rule option. Rule header consists
of a matching criteria together with an action that need to be performed when this criteria is
matched [113]. Alerts generated by Snort were stored using a binary format (unified2 file for-
mat) and it is not human readable. Therefore, these alerts were converted to human readable
format using Barnyard2 [114] interpreter and stored in a MySQL database for further process-
ing.
Few alerts were produced by Snort for the DARPA 2000 dataset is shown in table 3.1. A
Snort alert consists two major fields that are used to identify an intrusion which caused the
corresponding intrusion alert. These fields are called “alert type” (also known as alert de-
scription or alert signature) and “alert category” (also known as alert signature class). Alert
type contains detailed information about an intrusion whereas alert category contains higher
level information about an intrusion. As an example “UDP Filtered Portsweep” and “UDP
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Portsweep” alert types both belongs to “attempted-recon” alert category and the alert type
“UDP Filtered Portsweep” provides much more specific information than the alert category
“attempted-recon”.
3.3.1 Alert Pre-Processing
The first step of the pre-processing was to format raw alerts from different IDSs to a common
format and then duplicated alerts were removed using selected features. Timestamp, source IP,
source port, destination IP, destination port, alert signature and alert signature class were used
to identify duplicate alerts.
3.3.2 Alert Clustering
As described in section 2.3.1 most of the intrusion prediction methods are focused on prediction
of next attack category only. However, only predicting next possible attack category is not
sufficient to select an efficient response action. If we can predict next possible attack with
victim and attacker host information, it would provide a better opportunity to execute a useful
response action. The main objective of alert clustering is to group similar alerts together to
maximize the information of alerts. Bag of Words (BoW) model, which is a popular concept
in text document classification, was used to compare similarities between two alerts.
3.3.3 Bag of Words (BoW) Model
Bag of Words (BoW) model is a popular document analysis algorithm used in text and image
classification. Bag of words model is based on following two assumptions.
• Documents are created by repetitively drawing one word from a bag of words which
forms the vocabulary,
• Words in the bag may occur multiple times in a document.
Figure 3.3 shows documents generation process using a bag of words vocabulary.
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Figure 3.3: Documents Generation Using Bag of Words Model.
Consider following simple documents to understand how we can use BoW concept to compare
documents.
Document 1. “Ann likes to play football.”
Document 2. “John likes to play tennis and football.”
Document 3. “Diana likes swimming.”
Vocabulary that used to compare these documents is shown in Figure 3.3. In practice high
frequently used terms such as “is”, “are” and “to” are not included in the vocabulary.
BoW model generates a term frequency matrix for each document based on count of words in
the vocabulary in each document as shown in table 3.2. Then by comparing term frequency
matrix, we can identify similar documents.
Table 3.2: BoW model term frequency for documents.
Documents
Vocabulary
My nice name likes meet Ann films football tennis john nice play
Document 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Document 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
Document 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
By analyzing the term frequency matrix, it can be observed that document 1 and 2 are similar
to each other while document 3 is different.
In above example only one global vocabulary is considered. However, different vocabular-
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ies provide an opportunity to group similar documents together more precisely. Figure 3.4
illustrates concept of different BoW model classes. Words related to sports are grouped in a
sports BoW class, words related to business are grouped in a business BoW class and words
related to mathematics are grouped in a mathematics BoW class. When a new document is
received, based on term frequency matrix of each BoW classes most suitable class for that
document is identified.
Figure 3.4: Different Bag of Words vocabulary classes.
Consider following example to illustrate this idea further:
Sports vocabulary = { goal, foul, penalty, football, captain, player }
Mathematics vocabulary = { calculus, multiplication, subtraction, division, polynomials, curve
}
Document 1. “Ann likes to read books.”
Document 2. “Football match between Brazil and Argentina is drawn. Each team scored
2 goals. Brazil captain scored two goals for their team, Argentina misses one penalty goal
chance otherwise, they may have won the game.”
Document 3. “Student should be familiar with basic mathematics operations such as multipli-
cation, subtraction and division. Calculus is part of secondary level education.”
Term frequency matrix of document 1, 2 and 3 for mathematical and sports BoW vocabularies
are shown in table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Term frequency matrix of documents for mathematical and sports BoW vocabular-
ies.
Documents
Sport Vocabulary Mathematics Vocabulary
goal foul penalty football captain player calculus multiplication subtraction division polynomials curve
Document 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Document 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Document 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
By observing term frequency matrices, it can be seen that document 1 does not belong to either
sports or mathematics classes. Document 2 belongs to sports class and document 3 is belong
to mathematics class.
This bag of words based text document classification concept was used to cluster alerts. Fig-
ure 3.5 illustrates alert clustering process. In the first step, important attributes of alert were
selected to develop vocabulary. For this thesis, source IP address, source IP port, destination
IP address, destination IP port, signature (alert type) and signature class (alert category) were
selected to generate vocabulary.
Figure 3.5: Alert clustering using Bag of Words model concept.
The next step is to cluster alerts based on their attributes. For the clustering process, k-means
clustering algorithm was used. The k-means algorithm was first used by James MacQueen in
1967 [115]. Consider set of “n” data points X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ∈ R, where each data point is a
d-dimensional real vector. K-means clustering algorithm groups these features to k number of
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groups (k ≤ n) where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} represents the cluster set. Let mean of each clusters be
µ1, µ2, . . . , µk ∈ R. The aim of the k-means clustering is to minimize the sum of squared error
over all clusters as shown in the equation (3.1) [116].
argmin
S
k∑
k=1
∑
xi∈sk
‖xi − µk‖2. (3.1)
Historical alerts were used to generate set of alerts clusters. Once new alert was received, it
was assigned to the best matching cluster using k-means algorithm.
The main objective of clustering process is to generate a sequence of symbols that can be
modeled using sequential data modeling. Let k be the number of clusters was generated by
k-means algorithm (represent cluster set C = {C1,C2, ...,Ci, ...,Ck}). Furthermore, T number of
alerts ordered based on their time of origin (timestamp) was represented as A1, A2, ..., Ai, ..., Ak.
The best matching cluster (from cluster set C) for each alert was assigned by the alert clustering
module. Figure 3.6 illustrates this process.
Figure 3.6: Alert clustering using k-means and generating symbol sequence.
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3.4 Building Hidden Markov Models
A hidden Markov model was used to model sequential data produced from alert clustering
module. As described in hidden Markov model in section 2.3.1, hidden Markov model consist
of hidden states which produced the observations. Alert cluster sequence was considered as an
observation sequence in this model. Parameters of hidden Markov model is defined as:
1. N, Number of hidden states in the HMM. Where individual states are denoted as S =
{S 1, S 2, . . . , S N} and state at time t is denoted as qt.
2. M, Number of distinct observation symbols per state. Where individual symbols are
denoted as V = {v1, v2, . . . , vM}.
3. State transition probability (A) NxN matrix. Where ai j represents the state transition
probability form state i to state j.
ai j = P(qt+1 = S j|qt = S i),where 1 ≤ i ≤ Nand1 ≤ j ≤ N.
4. Observation emission probability (B) NxM matrix. Where kth observation emission
probability of the state j is represented by bj(k).
bj(k) = P(vk at t|qt = S j),where 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M.
5. Initial state probability distribution (pi). Where pi represents the initial states probabili-
ties of the HMM.
pii = P(q1 = S i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
6. Observation sequence (O). The observation sequence of length T is represented as O =
O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT , Where Ot is one of observation symbol from V.
Hidden Markov model is typically represented by using A, B and pi parameters and the
model is denoted as λ = (A, B, pi).
3.4.1 Hidden Markov Model Training
In this research, first order hidden Markov model was implemented where state transition from
one state to next state only depends on the previous state. In our model, observations are distinct
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alert cluster IDs generated from alert clustering module. The cluster ID sequence generated by
historical alerts was used to train the hidden Markov model. Hidden Markov model was trained
using Baum-Welch algorithm [97] as described in appendix A.
Notation:
• T = length of training alert sequence.
• k = number of clusters generated by k-means clustering module.
• Cluster set generated by k-means C = {C1,C2, ...,Ct, ...,Ck}.
• Training alert sequence = A1, A2, . . . , At, . . . , AT .
• Corresponding cluster sequence for training alert sequence θ= CA1,CA2, . . . ,CAt, . . . ,CAT
where CAt ∈ C f or 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
• Observation sequence O = O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT . In this model, observed alert cluster
sequence is taken as observation sequence.
Hence, O = θ = CA1,CA2, . . . ,CAt, . . . ,CAT .
• The best hidden state sequence matching for the given observation sequence (O) is Q =
q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . , qT .
• Initial states probabilities of the HMM (pi) matrix (1xN) is defined as:
pii ≈ 1/N, for i = 1, 2, ..., N.
• Initial state transition probability (A) matrix (NxN) is defined as:
ai j ≈ 1/N for i = 1, 2, ..., N and j = 1, 2, ..., N.
• Initial observation emission probability (B) matrix (NxM) is defined as:
bj(k) ≈ 1/M for j = 1, 2, ..., N and k = 1, 2, ..., M.
Hidden Markov model training process.
Forward probability, αt(i) is defined as:
αt(i) = P(O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT , qt = S i|λ). (3.2)
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Backward probability (β) is defined as:
βt(i) = P(Ot+1, . . . ,OT |qt = S i, λ). (3.3)
Define γt( j) which represents probability of being in state S j at time t as:
γt(j) = P(qt = S j|O, λ); f or 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ j ≤ N. (3.4)
Probability of transfer from state S i (at time t) to S j (at time t+1) is defined as ξt(i, j) as:
ξt(i, j) =
αt(i)ai jb j(Ot+1)βt+1( j)
P(O|λ) . (3.5)
From the definition of γt(i) and ξt(i, j) we can find the relationship between them as:
γt(i) =
N∑
j=1
ξt(i, j). (3.6)
Parameters of hidden Markov model calculation process is expressed as:
Expected value of initial probability pii =γ1(i) for i = 1, 2, ..., N.
State transition probability matrix(A):
aˆi j =
Expected total number of transition from state S i to S j
Expected total number of transition from state S i to any state
. (3.7)
aˆi j =
∑T−1
t=1 ξt(i, j)∑T−1
t=1 γt(i)
, f or i = 1, 2, ..., N and j = 1, 2, ..., N. (3.8)
Observation Emission probability matrix(B):
bˆ j(k) =
Expected total number of time in state S j and observing symbol vk
Expected total number of times in state S j
. (3.9)
bˆ j(k) =
T∑
t=1
Ot=vk
γt( j)
/ T∑
t=1
γt( j), f or i = 1, 2, ..., N and k = 1, 2, ..., M. (3.10)
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Calculation of probability of observation sequence P(O|λ):
P (O|λ) =
N∑
i=1
αT (i). (3.11)
• HMM parameters re-estimation process:
HMM parameters calculation process is an optimization problem. The optimal values can be
found using standard re-estimation process as shown in below [97].
Step 1. Initialize model with the best guess values for A, B and pi.
Step 2. Compute αt(i), βt(i), ξt(i, j) and γt(i).
Step 3. Re-estimate the model λ = (A, B, pi).
Step 4. If P (O|λ) increases (determined by improvement of A, B and pi) above a given
threshold value and then go to step 2; otherwise stop the process.
3.4.2 Hidden Markov Model Based Sequence Prediction
Trained hidden Markov model was used to predict next alert clusters based on observed alert
cluster sequence.
Notation:
• Trained HMM λ = (A, B, pi).
• T = Length of observed testing alert sequence.
• k = Number of clusters generated by k-means clustering module.
• Cluster set generated by k-means C = {C1,C2, ...,Ct, ...,Ck}.
• Observed testing alert sequence δ = A1, A2, . . . , At, . . . , AT .
• Corresponding cluster sequence for observed testing alert sequenceω = CA1,CA2, . . . ,CAt, . . . ,CAT
where CAt ∈ C f or 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
• Observation sequence O = O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT .
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In this model, observed alert cluster sequence was taken as observation sequence.
Hence, O = ω = CA1,CA2, . . . ,CAt, . . . ,CAT .
The main goal of this thesis is to predict next alert cluster (CAT+1) by assuming that previously
generated alert cluster IDs based on attacker activities are available. By predicting next alert
cluster, possible actions of the attacker can be identified.
The best hidden state sequence for the observed testing cluster ID sequence
(ω = CA1,CA2, . . . ,CAt, . . . ,CAT ) was identified using Viterbi algorithm.
Let Q = q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . , qT is the best hidden alert sequence. Using state transition probabil-
ity matrix (A) and observation emission probability matrix (B), probability of each cluster for
the next position is calculated. Based on the probabilities of clusters, the best possible candi-
date for next cluster is selected. Let last element of Q was S j. Probability of cluster Ci to be in
next observation can be calculated using equation 3.12:
Probability of cluster Ci to be in next observation (PT+1 (Ci)) =
N∑
r=1
a jr br(i).
Where Ci ∈ C.
(3.12)
Using equation 3.12 probability of each cluster to be in next position was calculated. In this
model, three possible clusters were identified for next observation based on their probability
values. These three were labeled as level 1 prediction, level 2 prediction and level 3 predic-
tion. Level 1 prediction includes cluster which has the highest probability. Level 2 prediction
includes highest and second highest probability clusters. Level 3 prediction includes first, sec-
ond and third highest probability clusters. Algorithm 1 illustrates pseudo code for next possible
alert cluster prediction. For multiple step prediction (prediction of many data points in one pre-
diction step), alert cluster which was predicted in previous prediction stage was appended to
input observation sequence when predicting next point. Algorithm 2 illustrates pseudo code
for multiple step alert cluster prediction.
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Algorithm 1: Hidden Markov model based alert prediction.
Input : Parameters of Trained Hidden Markov Model (A, B, pi, N, M),
Number of clusters = k, Where M = k
Observed testing alert cluster sequence ω = CA1,CA2, . . . ,CA j, . . . ,CAT
Where CA j ∈ C and T ≥ j ≥ 1.
Output : Top three candidates for next possible alert cluster
1 Begin;
2 /* Finding best hidden sequence for given observation sequence */
3 Best Hidden State Sequence(Q)= Viterbi Algorithm (A, B, pi, ω)
4 Select last element of Q (say S j)
5 Define Array P cluster[M] = [P cluster 1, ..., P cluster i, ...P cluster M]
6 for i← 1 to M (number of distinct observations) do
7 P← 0
8 for r ← 1 to N (number of hidden states) do
9 P← P + (a jr x br(i))
10 end
11 P cluster[i]← P
12 end
13 Level 1 Prediction = Select cluster which has highest probability value from P cluster
Array
14 Level 2 Prediction = Select clusters which have first and second highest probability
value from P cluster Array
15 Level 3 Prediction = Select clusters which have first, second and third highest
probability value from P cluster Array
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Algorithm 2: Hidden Markov model based alert prediction (multiple length).
Input : Parameters of Trained Hidden Markov Model (A, B, pi, N, M),
Number of clusters = k, Where M = k
Observed testing alert cluster sequence ω = CA1,CA2, . . . ,CA j, . . . ,CAT
Where CA j ∈ C and T ≥ j ≥ 1. l (length of the prediction)
Output : Top three candidates for next possible alert cluster
1 Begin:
2 counter ← 0
3 i← 0
4 if counter == 0 then
5 Input cluster ID sequence = ω
6 else
7 Input cluster ID sequence = New alert cluster ID sequence
8 /* Finding Level 1, 2, 3 Prediction using Algorithm 1 */
9 Level 1, 2, 3 Prediction = Algorithm1(Input cluster ID sequence)
10 Output: Level 1 Prediction, Level 2 Prediction and Level 3 Prediction
11 i← i + 1
12 CAT+i ← Level 1 Prediction
13 counter ← counter + 1
14 ω = Append CAT+i to ω
15 New alert cluster ID sequence = ω
16 if counter ≥ l, then
17 stop.
18 else
19 Go to Line 4
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3.5 Programming Language and Software tools
Alert pre-processing and prediction module was implemented using python programming lan-
guage. Snort intrusion detection system (version 2.9.8.0 with rule set 2980) was used for
intrusion alert generation. Alerts generated by the Snort were converted to human readable
format using Barnyard2 [114] interpreter. MYSQL database was used as a database for the
platform. Bag of words model implementation and k-means clustering implementation was
done using python scikit-learn library [117]. Hidden Markov model was implemented using
python programming language.
Chapter 4
Results
Experiments were performed in two phases. In the first phase, performance evaluation of
OneR, Adaboost, J48 decision tree, Random Forest and Random Tree machine learning tech-
niques based intrusion detection with feature reduction was conducted. Section 4.1 describes
feature reduction process and performance evaluation of machine learning techniques based
intrusion detection methods with feature reduction in detail.
In the second phase, performance evaluation of hidden Markov model based alert prediction
framework was conducted. Experiments were mainly focused on identifying the effect of the
number of clusters and HMM parameters on the accuracy of alert prediction. For the pur-
pose of comparison with other intrusion prediction research activities, both alert cluster based
prediction and alert category based prediction were evaluated. Section 4.2.1 describes the ex-
perimental process. Section 4.3 describes the performance evaluation of the alert prediction
framework. Also, it talks about IP address and cluster distribution of generated alerts. Section
4.4 describes about the alert clusters formed by the proposed alert prediction framework.
49
50 Chapter 4. Results
4.1 Machine Learning Techniques for Intrusion Detection
on Public Dataset with Feature Reduction
Intrusion detection capabilities of machine learning techniques namely OneR, Adaboost, J48
decision tree, Random Forest and Random Tree with feature reduction were evaluated. The
publicly available Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) [73] was used for the evaluation.
The Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) [73] is selected for the evaluation of different
machine learning techniques based intrusion detection with feature reduction techniques. The
main reason to select AWID dataset for this thesis is each record of the AWID dataset contains
155 attributes. This higher number of attributes provides opportunity to analyze impact on
different level of attribute reduction to the intrusion detection. Also, this dataset contains wide
range of intrusion types that can occur in an 802.11 Wi-Fi network and it provides opportunity
to analyze the impact of attribute reduction on the detection of wide range of intrusions types.
Filter-based feature reduction techniques namely Information Gain and Chi Squared test were
used for the feature reduction process.
4.1.1 Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID)
The Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) is a publicly available labeled dataset which was
developed based on real traces of both normal and intrusion activities of an 802.11 Wi-Fi net-
work under the supervision of University of the Aegean and George Mason University [73].
Single Access Point (AP) based network with WEP encryption was used to generate the AWID
dataset. In order to maintain the diversity of network devices laptops, mobile devices, desktop
computers, tablet devices and smart TVs were used in the AWID network setup. The main
limitation of this dataset is the fact that it is a simulated attack instead of a real attack. All
intrusions were generated by a laptop running Kali Linux 1.0.6 operating system. Therefore,
the AWID dataset may not represent the behavior of a real network which contains actual users
and attackers.
The AWID dataset consists of large and reduced datasets. It includes separate datasets for
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training (denoted as Trn) and testing (denoted as Tst). Each record of the dataset is classified
as either normal or a specific intrusion type (i.e., class attribute of a record is referred to a
type of intrusion or normal network activity). The AWID datasets are mainly classified into
two types based on their class distribution as high-level labeled dataset (AWID-CLS) and finer
grained labeled dataset (AWID-ATK). The class distribution of AWID datasets are shown in
table 4.1 [73]. The record distribution of AWID datasets are shown in table 4.2.
Table 4.1: Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) class distribution [73].
Dataset Class Lables
AWID-CLS-F-Trn Flooding,
AWID-CLS-F-Tst Impersonation,
AWID-CLS-R-Trn Injection,
AWID-CLS-R-Tst Normal.
AWID-ATK-F-Trn Amok, Arp, Authentication request, Beacon, Cafe latte,
AWID-ATK-R-Trn Deauthentication, Evil twin, Fragmentation,
Probe response, Normal.
AWID-ATK-F-Tst Amok, Arp, Authentication request, Beacon, Cafe latte,
Chop chop, Cts, Deauthentication, Disassociation,
Evil twin, Fragmentation, Hirte, Power saving, Probe request,
Probe response, Rts, Normal.
AWID-ATK-R-Tst Amok, Arp, Beacon, Cafe latte, Chop chop, Cts,
Deauthentication, Disassociation, Evil twin, Rts
Fragmentation, Hirte, Power saving, Probe request, Normal.
A Description about AWID class labels presented in table 4.1 is included in table B.1.
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Table 4.2: Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) record distribution [73].
Dataset Classes Type Records Normal Records %
AWID-ATK-F-Trn(full) 10 Train 162,375,247 97.151
AWID-ATK-F-Tst(full) 17 Test 48,524,866 97.528
AWID-CLS-F-Trn(full) 4 Train 162,375,247 97.151
AWID-CLS-F-Tst(full) 4 Test 48,524,866 97.528
AWID-ATK-R-Trn (reduced set) 10 Train 1,795,575 90.956
AWID-ATK-R-Tst (reduced set) 15 Test 575,643 92.207
AWID-CLS-R-Trn (reduced set) 4 Train 1,795,575 90.956
AWID-CLS-R-Tst (reduced set) 4 Test 530,643 92.207
AWID reduced datasets were chosen for evaluation of machine learning techniques based intru-
sion detection with feature reduction techniques. Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analy-
sis (WEKA) [111] was used as machine learning tool kit for the experiments. AWID-CLS-R-
Trn, AWID-CLS-R-Tst, AWID-ATK-R-Trn and AWID-ATK-R-Tst datasets were selected for
the experimental process. In order to reduce pre-processing complexity, the string attributes
were removed from the datasets and 111 attributes out of 155 were selected for the experi-
ments. Each attribute of a record of the AWID dataset except the class attribute is considered
as a feature during the feature reduction process. The features included in the AWID datasets
are shown in table B.2 and 111 features selected for the experiments are shown in table B.3.
Each dataset of AWID datasets consists of separate dataset for training and testing. Training
dataset was used to train the machine learning techniques and relevant testing dataset was used
to evaluate performance of the machine learning techniques.
4.1.2 Evaluation of Feature Reduction Techniques
Absolute feature rank does not purely reflect influence of that feature to the final result. There
can be some situations where all features may have higher or lower rank values without having
a much variation. Also, rank of features may have continuous decline phase. Both these condi-
tions do not highly influence to the final result [118]. The important fact that we can consider
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is the decline of rank value of features. If we can observe a sharp decline, then we can identify
the regions of features which are highly contributed to the final result [118].
To observe information gain and chi-squared statistic variation, features were sorted in de-
scending order based on their information gain and chi-squared statistic values. Then feature
IDs and rank of features was plotted with respect to each other as shown in Figure 4.1a, Fig-
ure 4.1b, Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b. It can be observed that, both information gain and
chi-squared statistics values become zero after 41 features. As shown in Figures 4.1b and Fig-
ure 4.2b, sharp reduction of information gain after top ranked 5, 8, 10 and 15 features were
observed.
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(a) Chi-squared feature evaluation for AWID-ATK-R dataset for 111 features.
(b) Chi-squared feature evaluation of AWID-ATK-R dataset for top 25 features.
Figure 4.1: Chi-squared feature evaluation for AWID-ATK-R dataset.
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(a) Information Gain feature evaluation of AWID-ATK-R-Trn dataset for 111 features.
(b) Information Gain feature evaluation of AWID-ATK-R-Trn for top 25 features.
Figure 4.2: Information Gain feature evaluation of AWID-ATK-R-Trn dataset.
4.1.3 Intrusion Detection Performance Evaluation with
Feature Reduction Techniques
Based on feature ranking values, two major feature set regions were identified. Those were
segments of 41 features and 10 features. Initially, evaluation was done without any feature
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selection to evaluate intrusion detection performance of the machine learning techniques. In
the second experiment, segments of 41 features were selected using information gain feature
reduction technique. In the third experiment, segments of 10 features were selected using chi-
squared statistic feature reduction technique. Accuracies of classification of Adaboost, J48,
OneR, Random Forest and Random Tree machine learning techniques were recorded in each
experiment. The experiments process is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The configurations of the
machine learning techniques are illustrated in table 4.3. Those configurations were kept fixed
during the experiments.
Figure 4.3: Intrusion detection performance evaluation with feature reduction techniques.
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Table 4.3: Machine learning techniques configurations.
Machine Learning Technique Parameters
Random Forest Maximum depth of the tree = Unlimited, Number of trees = 10
Random Tree Number of randomly chosen attributes (Kvalue) = log 2 x (number of attributes) + 1
Maximum depth of the tree = Unlimited
J48 (C4.5) Confidence Factor = 0.25, Minimum number of instances per leaf = 2
Adaboost Base classifier = Decision Stump Tree, Number of iterations = 10
OneR Minimum bucket size used for discretizing numeric attributes = 6
The performance of machine learning techniques with 111, 41 and 10 features are listed in
tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. Over 90 % classification accuracy was achieved by the all
five algorithms. The maximum accuracy of 95.12% was achieved by Random Tree algorithm
for high-level labeled data with 41 features. The maximum accuracy of 94.97% was achieved
by Random Forest algorithm for finer grained labeled with 41 features. It was observed that,
accuracy of the classification was increased by the maximum of 2.4% for Random Tree algo-
rithm and 1.8% for Random Forest algorithm for high-level labeled dataset and finer grained
labeled dataset respectively with respect to feature reduction from 111 features to 41 features.
However, accuracy of the classification was decreased by 1.44% for Random Forest algorithm
and 2.24% for Random Tree algorithm for high-level labeled dataset and finer grained labeled
dataset respectively.
Table 4.4: Machine learning evaluation of AWID with 111 features.
Dataset AWID-CLS-R-Trn and AWID-CLS-R-Tst AWID-ATK-R-Trn and AWID-ATK-R-Tst
Dataset (high-level class distribution) Dataset (finer grained class distribution)
Machine Learning OneR J48 Random Random Ada OneR J48 Random Random Ada
Technique Forest Tree Boost Forest Tree Boost
Correctly Classified% 92.17 94.39 94.83 92.72 91.85 92.07 94.37 93.21 94.58 91.80
Incorrectly Classified% 7.83 5.61 5.17 7.28 8.15 7.93 5.63 6.79 5.42 8.20
TP Rate 0.922 0.944 0.948 0.927 0.918 0.921 0.944 0.932 0.946 0.918
FP Rate 0.898 0.141 0.445 0.616 0.255 0.898 0.117 0.735 0.418 0.254
Precision 0.861 0.969 0.942 0.876 0.909 0.853 0.944 0.894 0.92 0.907
F-Measure 0.888 0.938 0.933 0.901 0.91 0.885 0.944 0.906 0.93 0.908
ROC Area 0.512 0.884 0.974 0.954 0.946 0.512 0.915 0.962 0.964 0.932
Time 25.3 222.9 734.0 116.6 486.9 25.2 198.2 849.4 93.3 278.3
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Table 4.5: Machine learning evaluation of AWID with 41 features.
Feature Selection Method :- Information Gain Feature Evaluation
Dataset AWID-CLS-R-Trn and AWID-CLS-R-Tst AWID-ATK-R-Trn and AWID-ATK-R-Tst
Dataset (high-level class distribution) Dataset (finer grained class distribution)
Machine Learning OneR J48 Random Random Ada OneR J48 Random Random Ada
Technique Forest Tree Boost Forest Tree Boost
Correctly Classified% 92.17 94.39 93.39 95.12 91.85 92.07 94.37 94.97 92.34 91.80
Incorrectly Classified% 7.83 5.61 6.61 4.88 8.15 7.93 5.63 5.03 7.66 8.20
TP Rate 0.922 0.944 0.934 0.951 0.918 0.921 0.944 0.95 0.923 0.918
FP Rate 0.898 0.141 0.646 0.538 0.255 0.898 0.117 0.573 0.826 0.254
Precision 0.861 0.969 0.928 0.91 0.909 0.853 0.944 0.907 0.864 0.907
F-Measure 0.888 0.938 0.912 0.93 0.91 0.885 0.944 0.927 0.891 0.908
ROC Area 0.512 0.884 0.957 0.704 0.946 0.512 0.915 0.967 0.694 0.932
Time 14.0 188.8 353.4 58.3 305.3 15.4 160.9 280.3 26.7 232.3
Table 4.6: Machine learning evaluation of AWID with 10 features.
Feature Selection Method :- Information Gain Feature Evaluation and Chi-Square Feature Evaluation
Dataset AWID-CLS-R-Trn and AWID-CLS-R-Tst AWID-ATK-R-Trn and AWID-ATK-R-Tst
Dataset (high-level class distribution) Dataset (finer grained class distribution)
Machine Learning OneR J48 Random Random Ada OneR J48 Random Random Ada
Technique Forest Tree Boost Forest Tree Boost
Correctly Classified% 92.17 92.44 92.31 91.82 91.85 92.07 92.21 92.29 90.76 91.80
Incorrectly Classified% 7.83 7.56 7.69 8.18 8.15 7.93 7.79 7.71 9.24 8.20
TP Rate 0.922 0.924 0.923 0.918 0.918 0.921 0.922 0.923 0.908 0.918
FP Rate 0.898 0.888 0.893 0.791 0.255 0.898 0.922 0.899 0.915 0.254
Precision 0.861 0.909 0.895 0.893 0.909 0.853 0.85 0.872 0.85 0.907
F-Measure 0.888 0.89 0.889 0.896 0.91 0.885 0.885 0.887 0.878 0.908
ROC Area 0.512 0.84 0.936 0.578 0.913 0.512 0.814 0.926 0.535 0.932
Time 5.14 78.71 151.86 19.03 48.23 4.7 111.25 182.71 24.67 44.85
When number of features was reduced to 10, accuracy was decreased by the maximum of
2.5% for Random Forest algorithm and maximum of 3.8% for Random Tree algorithm for
high-level labeled dataset and finer grained labeled dataset respectively. In the case of feature
reduction from 111 features to 41 features and 111 features to 10 features, processing times
were significantly reduced. The maximum processing time reduction of 51.85% was achieved
by Random Forest algorithm for high-level labeled dataset with feature reduction from 111
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features to 41 features. The maximum processing time reduction of 79.70% was achieved by
OneR algorithm for high-level labeled dataset with feature reduction from 111 features to 10
features. For finer grained labeled dataset, the maximum processing time reduction of 71.37%
and 83.88% was achieved by Random Tree algorithm and Adaboost algorithm respectively.
Accuracy of the classification and processing time is shown in Figures 4.4a, 4.4b, 4.5a and
4.5b respectively.
(a) Correctly classified % of high-level class
distribution dataset.
(b) Correctly classified % of finer grained class
distribution dataset.
Figure 4.4: Correctly classified % of AWID dataset.
(a) Build time of AWID dataset with high-level
class distribution.
(b) Build time of AWID dataset with finer grained
class distribution.
Figure 4.5: Build time of AWID dataset.
The AWID dataset was mainly divided in to two types based on its class distribution namely
high-level labeling and finer grained labeling. It can be observed that with increase of classes,
accuracy of the classification is slightly reduced. The maximum reduction of 2.78% for was
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recorded for Random Tree algorithm.
The area under ROC curve (AUC) is a better measurement to compare performance of classi-
fiers whereas a classifier with a higher AUC is better than a classifier with lower AUC. Very
low AUC value was recorded for OneR algorithm compare to all the other algorithms in every
cases. Over 0.9 values of AUC were achieved by Random Forest and Adaboost algorithms in
all the experiments.
Nine common features were selected by both Information Gain feature evaluation (IG) and
Chi-Square feature evaluation (CH) based on their ranked value when they were applied sep-
arately to the original datasets. These features are presented in table 4.7. Description about
these features can be found in [119].
Table 4.7: Top 10 ranked features selection based on Information Gain and Chi-Square feature
evaluation.
Rank Information Gain Feature Evaluation Chi-Square Feature Evaluation
1 Frame length on the wire Frame length stored into the capture file
(frame.len) (frame.cap.len)
2 Frame length stored into the capture file Frame length on the wire
(frame.cap.len) (frame.len)
3 MAC timestamp (radiotap.mactime) MAC timestamp (radiotap.mactime)
4 Time since reference or first frame Time since reference or first frame
(frame.time.relative) (frame.time.relative)
5 Epoch Time (frame.time.epoch) Epoch Time (frame.time.epoch)
6 Sequence number (wlan.seq) Sequence number (wlan.seq)
7 Time delta from previous captured frame Time delta from previous captured frame
(frame.time.delta) (frame.time.delta)
8 Time delta from previous displayed frame Time delta from previous displayed frame
(frame.time.delta.displayed) (frame.time.delta.displayed)
9 Data Length (data.len) Data Length (data.len)
10 Duration (wlan.duration) Fragment number (wlan.frag)
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4.1.4 Intrusion Detection Performance Evaluation with Different Levels
of Feature Reduction
To further analyze the impact of features to the classification accuracy, the method employed by
Gabrilovich et al was followed [118]. Features were sorted in descending order based on their
information gain rank and chi-squared values. Then features with less rank value (i.e. referred
as less informative features) were eliminated as percentages of 95%, 90%, 80%, 70%,..., 10%
and 0% and then classification accuracies were recorded. By considering accuracy of intrusion
detection in experiments conducted so far, Random Forest and J48 algorithms were selected
for classification accuracy comparison. The classification accuracy of intrusion detection of
Random Forest and J48 algorithms with different levels of feature reduction are illustrated in
Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and table 4.8 respectively.
Table 4.8: Correctly classified % of finer grained class distribution dataset (AWID-ATK-R)
with different feature reduction levels using information gain and chi-squared statistic.
Percentage of Less Informative
Features Reduction
Correctly Classified % Finer Grained Class Distribution Dataset(AWID-ATK-R)
Random Forest (CH) J48 (CH) Random Forest (IG) J48 (IG)
0 93.2055 94.3673 93.2055 94.3673
10 93.5934 94.3673 93.5934 94.3673
20 92.7743 94.3673 92.7743 94.3673
30 94.6409 94.3673 94.6409 94.3673
40 92.9713 94.3673 92.9835 94.3673
50 93.4428 94.3673 93.4428 94.3673
60 94.8355 94.3673 92.7625 94.3673
70 92.8158 94.3654 95.0763 94.3673
80 95.1640 94.3654 93.4867 94.3654
90 94.8633 94.4498 94.1467 94.4498
95 92.2606 92.2898 92.2606 92.2898
For J48 algorithm, with the increment of less informative features reduction percentage, accu-
racy of classification was remained almost the same at 94.36% until 80% of less informative
features reduction level. Accuracy of classification was slightly increased by 0.09% at 90% of
less informative feature reduction level and then decreased by 2.16% at 95% of less informa-
tive feature reduction level for both information gain and chi-squared statistic feature selection
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methods.
Figure 4.6: Correctly classified % of finer grained class distribution dataset(AWID-ATK-R)
with different feature reduction levels using information gain feature selection method.
Figure 4.7: Correctly classified % of finer grained class distribution dataset(AWID-ATK-R)
with different feature reduction levels using chi-squared statistic feature selection method.
For Random Forest algorithm, smooth transition of accuracy with the increment of less infor-
mative features reduction was not observed. With the increment of less informative features
reduction percentage, the maximum accuracy of classification 95.0763% was recorded at 70%
of feature reduction level for information gain and 95.1640% was recorded at 80% of fea-
ture reduction level for chi-squared statistics. With this results it was observed that, feature
reduction improves the classification accuracy with proper selection of feature reduction level.
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4.1.5 Summary
It was observed that, processing times were significantly decreased in the range of 15.29% to
51.85% and 16.54% to 71.37% with a maximum accuracy increment of 2.4% and 1.8% for
high-level labeled dataset and finer grained labeled dataset respectively with respect to fea-
ture reduction from 111 features to 41 features. For feature reduction from 111 features to
10 features, processing times were significantly decreased in the range of 27.46% to 79.70%
and 43.87% to 83.88% with the reduction of accuracy of the classification in the range of 0 to
2.5% and 0 to 3.8% for high-level labeled dataset and finer grained labeled dataset respectively.
Intrusion datasets are used to train, test and evaluate intrusion detection systems. It is chal-
lenging to identify relevant features that have a significant impact on the accuracy of intrusion
detection. With a better feature identification, it is possible to develop an efficient IDS. The
experimental results indicate that the feature reduction can improve the detection accuracy
and the classification speed. However, simply removing low ranked features do not necessar-
ily improve the classification accuracy. Different feature reduction levels should be inspected
to identify the best feature reduction level. Frequent evaluations of datasets are important to
identify weakness of datasets which helps in developing new datasets with better utility. Net-
work intrusions are growing rapidly and new attack vectors are continuously being developed.
Therefore, it is very challenging to generate a dataset that includes most of new intrusion types.
Hence continuous evaluation and development of datasets are very important.
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4.2 Hidden Markov Model Based Alert Prediction
In second phase of experiments, performance evaluation of hidden Markov model based alert
prediction was conducted. Experiments were mainly focused on identifying the effect of the
number of clusters and HMM parameters on the accuracy of alert prediction.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
The DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) [69] dataset was used in the ex-
perimental process. The main reason to select DARPA as a dataset because it consists of two
sets of multi-stage attack scenarios, which are quite similar to each other. As described in the
chapter 3, Snort was used as an intrusion detection system. TCPdump files of the DARPA
datasets were sent to Snort IDS to generate alerts. Alerts generated by Snort were sorted based
on their time stamp and then sent into the alert pre-processing module followed by the alert
clustering module. The corresponding cluster sequence for the input alerts sequence was gen-
erated by alert clustering module. Alert cluster sequential series was then sent into the hidden
Markov model which was responsible for predicting future intrusion activities.
4.2.2 DARPA Intrusion Dataset
The DARPA data set includes three datasets: DARPA1998, DARPA1999 and DARPA2000.
DARPA1998 and DARPA1999 data sets are related to intrusion detection evaluation. DARPA2000
data set was generated based on the specific scenarios. Two main segments namely DMZ Hosts
and inside hosts were included in the network which was used to generate DARPA2000 dataset.
DMZ consists of one IP segment 172.16.114.0/24 and inside hosts consist of five IP segments
(172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.115.0/24, 172.16.116.0/24, 172.16.117.0/24 and 172.16.118.0/24).
This dataset consists of data related to a complex network attack with several phases. Specifi-
cally, it consists of two multi-stage attacks labeled LLDOS 1.0 and LLDOS 2.0.2. Both these
attacks have five main stages [69].
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LLDOS 1.0 - Scenario One.
• Attacker probes the network.
• Detect node running “sadmin” demon.
• Attacker breaks in to a host by exploiting the Solaris “sadmind” vulnerability.
• Attacker installs trojan “mstream” DDoS software.
• Attacker launches a DDoS attack at an off site server.
LLDOS 2.0.2 - Scenario Two.
• Attacker probes public DNS server.
• Attacker breaks in to a host by exploiting the Solaris “sadmind” vulnerability.
• Attacker installs DDoS software and scripts via FTP.
• Attacker compromised other two hosts in the network.
• Attacker launches a DDoS attack using compromised hosts.
DARPA 2000 raw network packets were sent into Snort intrusion detection system to generate
alerts. 11,264 and 10,468 raw alerts were generated by DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 and DARPA
2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 respectively. These alerts were then sent into the alert pre-processing mod-
ule. Redundant alerts with same attributes were filtered by the alert pre-processing module.
After this process the total number of alerts were reduced to 5113 and 5645 respectively. Dur-
ing the next step, these alerts were forwarded to the alert clustering module.
A Snort alert consists two major fields that are used to identify an intrusion which caused the
corresponding intrusion alert. These fields are called “alert type” (also refer as alert description
or alert signature) and “alert category” (also refer as alert class). Alert type contains detailed
information about an intrusion whereas alert category contains higher level information about
an intrusion. As an example “UDP Filtered Portsweep” and “UDP Portsweep” alert types both
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belongs to “attempted-recon” alert category and the alert type “UDP Filtered Portsweep” pro-
vides much more specific information than the alert category “attempted-recon”. Snort consists
of 34 alert categories (alert classes) as shown in table 4.9. There are four levels in those cate-
gories based on their influence [120].
Nine alerts categories and 21 alerts descriptions were produced for DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0
while nine alerts categories and 19 alerts descriptions were produced for DARPA 2000 LLDOS
2.0.2 by Snort IDS as shown in table 4.10.
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Table 4.9: Snort alert class (alert category) types [120].
Class Type (alert category) Description Priority
attempted-admin Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain high
attempted-user Attempted User Privilege Gain high
inappropriate-content Inappropriate Content was Detected high
policy-violation Potential Corporate Privacy Violation high
shellcode-detect Executable code was detected high
successful-admin Successful Administrator Privilege Gain high
successful-user Successful User Privilege Gain high
trojan-activity A Network Trojan was detected high
unsuccessful-user Unsuccessful User Privilege Gain high
web-application-attack Web Application Attack high
attempted-dos Attempted Denial of Service medium
attempted-recon Attempted Information Leak medium
bad-unknown Potentially Bad Traffic medium
default-login-attempt Attempt to login by a default username and password medium
denial-of-service Detection of a Denial of Service Attack medium
misc-attack Misc Attack medium
non-standard-protocol Detection of a non-standard protocol or event medium
rpc-portmap-decode Decode of an RPC Query medium
successful-dos Denial of Service medium
successful-recon-largescale Large Scale Information Leak medium
successful-recon-limited Information Leak medium
suspicious-filename-detect A suspicious filename was detected medium
suspicious-login An attempted login using a suspicious username was detected medium
system-call-detect A system call was detected medium
unusual-client-port-connection A client was using an unusual port medium
web-application-activity Access to a potentially vulnerable web application medium
icmp-event Generic ICMP event low
misc-activity Misc activity low
network-scan Detection of a Network Scan low
not-suspicious Not Suspicious Traffic low
protocol-command-decode Generic Protocol Command Decode low
string-detect A suspicious string was detected low
unknown Unknown Traffic low
tcp-connection A TCP connection was detected low
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Table 4.10: Snort alert descriptions and categories generated for DARPA LLDOS 1.0 and
LLDOS 2.0.2 by Snort.
Snort alert descriptions and categories generated for DARPA LLDOS 1.0
No Signature Name (alert description) Signature Class Name (alert category)
1 portscan: UDP Filtered Portsweep attempted-recon
2 portscan: ICMP Filtered Sweep attempted-recon
3 portscan: UDP Portsweep attempted-recon
4 portscan: TCP Distributed Portscan attempted-recon
5 portscan: TCP Portsweep attempted-recon
6 PROTOCOL-DNS TMG Firewall Client long host entry exploit attempt attempted-user
7 ET ATTACK RESPONSE Output of id command from HTTP server bad-unknown
8 stream5: TCP Small Segment Threshold Exceeded bad-unknown
9 stream5: FIN number is greater than prior FIN bad-unknown
10 ET POLICY FTP Login Successful misc-activity
11 ET POLICY Inbound Frequent Emails - Possible Spambot Inbound misc-activity
12 ET POLICY Executable and linking format (ELF) file download policy-violation
13 spp arpspoof: Directed ARP Request protocol-command-decode
14 sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded sdf
15 sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses sdf
16 ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95) trojan-activity
17 http inspect: MESSAGE WITH INVALID CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE unknown
18 http inspect: NO CONTENT-LENGTH OR TRANSFER-ENCODING IN HTTP RESPONSE unknown
19 http inspect: UNKNOWN METHOD unknown
20 http inspect: SIMPLE REQUEST unknown
21 http inspect: UNESCAPED SPACE IN HTTP URI unknown
Snort alert descriptions and categories generated for DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2
No Signature Name (Alert Description) Signature Class Name (Alert Category)
1 portscan: UDP Portsweep attempted-recon
2 portscan: UDP Filtered Portsweep attempted-recon
3 PROTOCOL-DNS TMG Firewall Client long host entry exploit attempt attempted-user
4 ET ATTACK RESPONSE Output of id command from HTTP server bad-unknown
5 ET INFO PDF Using CCITTFax Filter bad-unknown
6 http inspect: LONG HEADER bad-unknown
7 stream5: Reset outside window bad-unknown
8 stream5: FIN number is greater than prior FIN bad-unknown
9 stream5: TCP Small Segment Threshold Exceeded bad-unknown
10 ET POLICY FTP Login Successful misc-activity
11 ET POLICY Executable and linking format (ELF) file download policy-violation
12 spp arpspoof: Directed ARP Request protocol-command-decode
13 sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded sdf
14 sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses sdf
15 ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95) trojan-activity
16 ET INFO Exectuable Download from dotted-quad Host trojan-activity
17 http inspect: NO CONTENT-LENGTH OR TRANSFER-ENCODING IN HTTP RESPONSE unknown
18 http inspect: MESSAGE WITH INVALID CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE unknown
19 http inspect: UNESCAPED SPACE IN HTTP URI unknown
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4.2.3 Bag of Words Generation and Clustering Process
As described in the methodology section (section 3.3.3), first step was to generate the vocab-
ulary for BoW model that represents alert attributes. For this purpose, DARPA 2000 LLDOS
1.0-scenario one was selected. Few sample alerts shown in table 4.11 were used to illustrate
BoW vocabulary creation. Source IP address, destination IP address, alert type ID and alert
category were used for vocabulary generation, where alert type was represented by alert type
ID. Each unique word in alert attributes was added to the vocabulary. IP address was treated in
a special way where four segments of an address was considered as four separate words. BoW
vocabulary which was generated from sample alerts shown in table 4.11 is shown in table 4.12.
Table 4.11: Few Snort alerts generated for DARPA 2000 Dataset.
Source IP Destination IP Alert Type ID Alert Category
172.16.112.100 172.16.112.20 650 attempted-recon
172.16.112.50 172.16.113.169 506 sdf
172.16.116.201 206.83.105.134 36489 trojan-activity
207.25.71.186 172.16.117.132 684 unknown
209.87.178.183 192.168.5.122 41297 web-application-attack
Table 4.12: BoW vocabulary generated from alerts shown in table 4.11.
Bag of Words Vocabulary
activity application attack attempted recon sdf trojan unknown web
16 168 169 172 178 183 186 192 50
83 87 105 112 113 115 116 117
684 71 207 209 25 506 650 20
206 134 36489 201 100 122 132 41297
The next task would be cluster this vocabulary to set of word cluster. As an example let total
number of clusters was selected as five and then vocabulary (which was generated in previous
step) was clustered to five clusters by the k-means clustering module. These clusters are shown
in table 4.13.
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Table 4.13: BoW vocabulary clusters generated from alerts shown in table 4.11.
Cluster Name Elements in Clusters
Cluster 0 87 183 178 209 41297 168 192 122 web application
Cluster 1 172 16 112 113 169 50 506 178 168 sdf
Cluster 2 206 172 36489 16 134 83 201 116 105 trojan
Cluster 3 71 132 207 25 172 16 684 186 117 unknown
Cluster 4 16 172 100 112 115 20 650 186 recon attempted
Based on these observations, it can be seen that cluster 0 represents “web application attack”
between IP address 209.87.178.183 and IP address 192.168.5.122, cluster 2 represents “trojan
activity attack” between IP address 172.16.116.201 and IP address 206.83.105.134 and so on.
When a new alert was received, the best matching cluster for that alert was assigned by the alert
clustering module based on alert attributes. The main objective of clustering is to combine alert
attributes and generates a single unit that represents different alerts attributes. This single unit
is the cluster ID. A Cluster ID sequence for given input alert sequence was generated by the
alert clustering module and that sequence was used as a sequential data series in our model.
This sequential data series was used to build HMM module and predict future alert clusters.
In this thesis, DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0-scenario one was used for vocabulary generation and
then that vocabulary was clustered using the k-means algorithm. There were 243 unique words
in the vocabulary, which was generated using DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0-scenario one. The
DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 - scenario two was used as a test network that must be monitored
and predicted future activities. DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset TCPdump files were sent
into Snort. Generated alerts were ordered based on their timestamps and then sent into the
pre-processing module and the clustering module. The corresponding cluster IDs for the input
alert sequence were assigned by the alert clustering module, which performed sequential data
series. Part of that sequential data series was used to train HMM module and other segment
was used to test prediction capabilities of HMM module. This process is illustrated in Figure
4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Generation of cluster ID for Snort alerts and alert cluster ID prediction process.
The objective of alert clustering is to group alerts which have similar attributes together. In
experiments number of clusters were changed as 5, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 30, 40 and 50 to
observe the effect of number of clusters to the prediction output.
4.3 Alert Prediction
Performance evaluation of hidden Markov model based alert prediction module was performed
using the alert cluster ID sequence generated by DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset. The
length of the cluster ID sequence generated for DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 was 5645. 2500
data points were used to train hidden Markov model and other segment was used to evaluate
prediction capabilities of the model.
Following experiments were conducted to evaluate performance of proposed alert prediction
framework. Detailed description about below mentioned experiments is included in sections
4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
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• Performance evaluation of next alert cluster prediction.
1. Effect of number of hidden states in hidden Markov model on the prediction accu-
racy.
2. Effect of the training length on the prediction accuracy.
3. Effect of number of clusters on the prediction accuracy.
4. Performance evaluation of multiple intrusions predictions.
• Performance evaluation of next alert category (alert class) prediction.
1. Effect of number of hidden states in hidden Markov model on the prediction accu-
racy.
2. Performance evaluation of multiple intrusions predictions.
4.3.1 Performance Evaluation of Next Alert Cluster Prediction
Let the cluster ID sequence generated by the alert clustering module for DARPA 2000 LLDOS
2.0.2 dataset be denoted by CA1,CA2, ...CA j....,CAN and N be the length of the sequence. Data
series up to N/2 points (θ = CA1,CA2, ...CA j....,CAN/2) was used to train HMM Module. Re-
maining segment (ω = CA(N/2)+1, ...CA j....,CAN) was used to evaluate prediction capabilities of
the model. Let testing series ω was denoted as X = x1, x2, ...x j...., xT where T was the length of
the testing sequence. In order to predict cluster at j + 1 location, data series up to j (x1, x2, ...x j)
was sent to the HMM prediction model. During experiment process j was changed from 1 to
T − 1. Since the cluster at j + 1 location was known, predicted cluster for j + 1 location was
compared with the actual cluster at j + 1 location to evaluate prediction performance. Accuracy
of the prediction was calculated using the equation as shown in 4.1
Accuracy of the Prediction =
Correctly Predicted Alert Clusters
Total Number of Predictions
. (4.1)
In order to easily compare our results with existing alert prediction research activities, three
accuracy values were calculated. Those were named as level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1), level
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2 prediction accuracy (αL2) and level 3 prediction accuracy (αL3). These notations were used
throughout this thesis.
1. Level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1). In level 1 prediction accuracy, a correct prediction
means that, most probable prediction of the alert prediction framework is matched with
next action of the attacker.
2. Level 2 prediction accuracy (αL2). In level 2 prediction accuracy, a correct prediction
means that, one of two most probable predictions of the alert prediction framework is
matched with next action of the attacker.
3. Level 3 prediction accuracy (αL3). In level 3 prediction accuracy, a correct predic-
tion means that, one of three most probable predictions of alert prediction framework
is matched with next action of the attacker.
• Effect of number of hidden states in hidden Markov model on the prediction accu-
racy
The number of hidden states is one of the major parameter of the hidden Markov model. There
is no straightforward method to determine the best number of hidden states of a hidden Markov
model [97]. To find out the best model, number of hidden states were changed from 2 to 10
with increment of 1 at a time. Accuracy of alert prediction are shown in Figure 4.9. The maxi-
mum αL1 was observed as 67% for a HMM with 8 hidden states. The lowest αL1 was observed
as 43% for a HMM with 2 hidden states. It was observed that, with the increment of the num-
ber of states αL1 was initially increased and then decreased. The maximum αL3 was observed
as 84% for a HMM with 7 hidden states. By considering this results, it can be observed that
the number of hidden states has a significant impact on the accuracy of prediction. αL1 was
changed from 43% to 67% with the varying number of hidden states. During the experiments
cluster size was kept at 10.
Variation of prediction accuracy (αL1) with the length of running sequence is shown in Figure
4.10. Initially, accuracy of prediction was not very stable. It was observed that, after predicting
1500 alerts, accuracy of prediction was stabilized and converged to a steady value.
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A HMM with 8 hidden states was achieved the maximum accuracy of prediction (αL1). There-
fore, that HMM module was selected for other experiments beyond this point.
Figure 4.9: Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with number of states in hidden
Markov model.
Figure 4.10: Level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1) of alert clusters variation with length of running
sequence.
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• Effect of the training length on the prediction accuracy
The length of training data sequence has a significant impact on learning process of hidden
Markov model parameters (A- state transition probability matrix, B- observation emission
probability matrix, pi - initial state probability). Variation of prediction accuracy (αL1) with
the length of the training sequence is shown in Figure 4.11. The length of the cluster ID
sequence which was generated from DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 was 5645. The length of
training sequence was changed from 500 to 3500 with the increments of 500 at a time. The
remaining segment was used to evaluate prediction performance. Prediction accuracy of next
alert cluster ID was recorded for remaining length of the sequence (as an example let the length
of training sequence to be 500 and the length of testing sequence to be 5145). Results indicate
that, insufficient training lengths produce very low αL1 (around 20%) for training length 500
and 1000. With the increment of training length αL1 was increased and the maximum value
for αL1 was recorded as 73% for the training length of 3500.
Figure 4.11: Level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1) of alert clusters variation with length of training
sequence.
• Effect of number of clusters on the prediction accuracy
The number of unique observation symbols (i.e. symbol size) has a significant impact on the
prediction accuracy. To illustrate the impact on the size of unique observation symbols, number
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of clusters were changed from 5 to 50. It was observed that HMM prediction fail to achieve
better accuracy for higher observation symbol size. Alert perdition accuracy variation with the
number of clusters is shown in Figure 4.12.
It is obvious that, a high number of clusters produced better separation among alerts and which
result in better grouping. For DARPA dataset there were 9 different alert categories and 19 dif-
ferent alert types produced by Snort. Therefore, in order to group alerts by their corresponding
alert category and corresponding alert type at least 9 and 19 clusters were required respectively.
The maximum value for αL1 was 88% recorded for 5 clusters and the lowest 31% was recorded
for 50 clusters. However, up to 30 clusters αL3 was remained over 70%.
Figure 4.12: Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with number of clusters.
• Performance evaluation of multiple intrusions predictions
As described in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.1 most of the research activities were focused on predict-
ing next possible step only. In this thesis, multiple point prediction of length of l was executed
as:
Let testing series was denoted as X = x1, x2, ...x j...., xT where T was the length of the testing
sequence. In order to predict the cluster at j + 1 location, data series up to j (x1, x2, ...x j) was
sent to the HMM prediction model. The predicted cluster for ( j + 1)th location was appended
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to the input to predict cluster at ( j + 2)th location. This cycle continued until l number of clus-
ters was predicted by HMM (i.e. data series up to j (x1, x2, ...x j) was used to predict l number
of future clusters). After l number of clusters had been predicted by the HMM, next predic-
tion cycle was started. For that next cycle, data series up to j + l was selected and that cycle
was continued until the system had predicted another l number of clusters. Likewise, system
had continuously predicted multiple lengths of data points until it reached end of data sequence.
To examine the multiple data points prediction capability of HMM prediction module, the
length of prediction (l) was changed from 1 to 5 and accuracy of prediction was recorded for
10 clusters. Accuracy of predictions is shown in Figure 4.13. It was observed that, with the
increment of prediction length accuracy of prediction was decreased. One data point prediction
was achieved the highest accuracy of 67%, 77% and 81% for αL1, αL2 and αL3 correspondingly
while five data point prediction was achieved lowest with 53%, 65% and 77% correspondingly.
Figure 4.13: Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with multiple data point prediction.
To further analyze how the number of clusters were effected on the accuracy of prediction,
the number of clusters were changed from 10 to 50 while keeping the length of prediction as
10. These results are shown in Figure 4.14. The maximum value 69% for αL3 was achieved
by the prediction module with 10 clusters configuration. The minimum value 13% for αL3
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was achieved by the prediction module with 50 clusters configuration. Up to 20 clusters, αL3
remains higher than 60%. However, for 30, 40 and 50 clusters, accuracy of prediction was
decreased significantly. In multiple length prediction, predicted symbol in the previous state
was append to the input sequence to predict next symbol. Hence error of previous prediction
was propagated to other predictions as well.
Figure 4.14: Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with number of clusters for 10 data
point prediction.
4.3.2 Performance Evaluation of Next Alert Category (alert class)
Prediction
As described in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.1 most of alert prediction research activities were largely
focused on predicting future alert category. In order to compare proposed hidden Markov
model with other network intrusion prediction research activities, alert category based pre-
diction was evaluated. For following experiments, sequential data series was generated by
considering an alert category as an observation. For DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset nine
different alert categories were generated by Snort. These alerts categories were mapped to the
symbols as shown in table 4.14. As an example, let alert category sequence is generated by
Snort as “Attempted-user”, “Policy-violation”, “Trojan-activity”, “Attempted-user” and “Misc-
activity”. Then based on the mapping, corresponding symbol sequence for this five alerts is
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B, E, H, B and D. By using this mapping, alert sequence generated for DARPA 2000 LLDOS
2.0.2 was converted to a symbol series. Similar to the other experiments 2500 data points were
used to train hidden Markov model and the remaining segment was used to evaluate prediction
performance.
Table 4.14: Snort alert categories generated for DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2 with symbol mapping.
Alert Category Symbol
attempted-recon A
attempted-user B
bad-unknown C
misc-activity D
policy-violation E
protocol-command-decode F
sdf G
trojan-activity H
unknown I
• Effect of number of hidden states in hidden Markov model on the
prediction accuracy
To evaluate the accuracy of alert prediction with the number of hidden states, the number of
hidden states were changed from 2 to 10 with increment of 2 at a time. The results of this
experiment is shown in Figure 4.15. The maximum αL1 of 76% was recorded for HMMs with
six and eight number of hidden states. Also, it was observed that sudden drop of accuracy was
recorded for a HMM with 10 hidden states. It was observed that, for this model number of
hidden states were higher than the number of unique observations. Also, 10% of αL3 accuracy
improvement was observed for prediction of alert categories compared to prediction of alert
clusters size of 10.
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Figure 4.15: Prediction accuracy of alert category variation with number of hidden states in
HMM.
• Performance evaluation of multiple intrusions predictions
To examine the multiple data points prediction capability of the HMM prediction module, the
length of prediction (l) was changed from 1 to 5 and accuracy of prediction was recorded.
Accuracy of future alert category predictions is shown in Figure 4.16. With the increment of
prediction length, the prediction accuracy was decreased. The maximum prediction accuracies
for αL1, αL2 and αL3 were observed as 76%, 91% and 94% correspondingly for single intrusion
prediction while the lowest was observed for five intrusions prediction as 72%, 88% and 92%
respectively. By comparing these results, it was observed that, better prediction results were
achieved for small observation symbol size.
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Figure 4.16: Prediction accuracy of alert category variation with multiple data point prediction.
Fava et al. [11] presented an alert prediction method based on variable length Markov model
which is similar the proposed alert prediction framework. The major differences between their
approach and the proposed algorithm is that they have generated three separate Markov models
for alert category, alert description and destination IP address attributes of an alert. By using
these models, they predicted the next alert category, next alert description and destination IP
address separately. With this approach, they achieved an accuracy of 90% for αL3 for predicting
the next alert category. When the prediction algorithm proposed in this thesis was constrained
to only predict the alert category without additional information, it obtained an accuracy of
95% for αL3. Following are the key differences between the proposed algorithm and that of
Fava et al. method:
1. Fava et al. used a data set developed in-house for their experiments whereas this thesis
presents results from the DARPA data set.
2. The closest result that can be compared is the prediction of next alert category. The
DARPA data set has nine unique alert categories whereas Fava et al. doesn’t disclose the
number of unique alert types that are present in their data set.
3. When the proposed alert prediction framework was used to predict the alert category as
well as the source IP address, the destination IP address, and the alert type, it achieved
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a level 3 prediction accuracy (αL3) of 81%, 81%, 76%, 78%, 75% and 72% for cluster
sizes of 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 respectively. Even thought the proposed alert clus-
ter prediction achieved lower prediction accuracy compared to Fava et al. method, it
provides critical information the intrusion which will be essential for any response.
4.3.3 Node IP and Alert Cluster Distribution
Alerts were generated by Snort for DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 contains 187 different source IP
addresses and 172 different destinations IP addresses for 5466 alerts. Those IP addresses were
belonged to DARPA network and outside networks. The average number of alerts per desti-
nation host was 32. Distribution of destination IP addresses of alerts is shown in Figure 4.17.
There were 34 destination IPs targeted more than 50 times. Host 172.16.116.194 were tar-
geted in 262 times and hosts 172.16.115.87, 172.16.113.207, 172.16.116.44, 172.16.113.148,
172.16.113.168, 172.16.112.194, 172.16.117.132, 135.13.216.191 and 172.16.112.149 were
targeted 199, 185 152, 127, 126, 99, 93, 92 and 54 times respectively. The average number
of alerts generated by a host was 32 and there were 15 hosts generated more than 50 alerts.
Distribution of source IP addresses of alerts is shown in Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.17: Destination IP distribution of alert generated for DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2.
Figure 4.18: Source IP distribution of alert generated for DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2.
The objective of alert clustering is to group alerts which have similar attributes. The HMM
prediction results indicated that, prediction accuracy had been improved with less number of
clusters. But it is not possible to decrease number of clusters, because when number of clus-
ters are reduced, it decreases the clear separation among alert clusters. To further illustrates
this factor, number of different alert categories in each cluster were analyzed. Alert category
distribution with the number of clusters is shown in table 4.15 and Figure 4.19.
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Table 4.15: Alert cluster distribution of DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2.
Alert Category 5 Clusters 10 Clusters 20 Clusters 30 Clusters 40 Clusters 50 Clusters
unknown 2 4 9 11 18 22
sdf 1 2 4 8 11 10
trojan-activity 1 2 3 5 4 6
protocol-command-decode 1 1 1 1 1 1
attempted-user 0 0 1 1 1 1
attempted-recon 0 1 1 1 1 1
bad-unknown 0 0 0 0 1 1
misc-activity 0 0 0 0 1 1
policy-violation 0 0 0 0 1 1
Figure 4.19: Alert cluster distribution of DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2.
For 5 clusters, there were two separate cluster groups for “unknown” alert category and one
separate cluster group for “sdf”, “trojan-activity” and “protocol-command-decode” alert cat-
egories respectively. However, when the number of clusters increased to 10, there were four
separate cluster groups for “unknown” alert category, two separate cluster groups for “sdf”
and“trojan-activity” alerts categories, one cluster group for “protocol-command-decode” and
4.4. Alert Cluster Output 85
one cluster group for “attempted-recon” alert category. It can be observed that, with the in-
crease of number of clusters clear separation between alert categories was witnessed. Also,
alerts belong to same category were split into different alert clusters based on their IP address.
As an example for 20 cluster configuration, there were nine clusters for “unknown” alert cat-
egory, four clusters were generated for “sdf” alert category and three clusters were generated
for “trojan-activity” alert category. These results indicate that, it is beneficial to increase the
number of clusters which improves separation between alert clusters. As a result of that more
similar alerts can be grouped together. On the other hand, the number of clusters was highly
related to the accuracy of prediction. With the increase of the number of clusters prediction
accuracy tends to decrease as described in section 4.3. Possible solution for this problem is
further discussed in section 5.2.3.
4.4 Alert Cluster Output
It is important to find out what are the information that can be extracted from prediction output
in order to determine possible responses. In this thesis, intrusion alerts attributes were used to
cluster similar alerts together. Source IP address, destination IP address, alert type (alert signa-
ture) and alert category (alert signature class) were used to cluster intrusion alerts together. It
impractical to consider exact source IP address and destination IP address in clustering process.
It will eventually increase number of clusters as well. As a solution for this, exact source IP
(such as 172.178.12.189) and destination IP range (such as 192.168.1.0/24) were considered.
This selection can be justified since number of attackers are much less than number of users.
Some of the important clusters were formed by the proposed system is shown in table 4.16.
Alert prediction module predicts future alert cluster that can be occur in the future. Then by
analyzing alert attributes of the predicted cluster, response system can determine what is the
type of the intrusion, from which source IP to which destination IP range it is going to happen.
Based on this information, response system can execute response action for that network seg-
ment.
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As an example, if prediction module predicts next possible cluster as cluster ID 1 where that
represents alerts attributes:
Outside Network IP address: 199.95.209.99, Inside Network IP range: 172.16.116.0/24
Alert Class: trojan-activity, Alert Type: ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95).
By looking at this information, response system can determine a possible future trojan ac-
tivity (ET MALWARE User-Agent) that can occur from 199.95.209.99 (outside IP range) to
172.16.116.0/24 network segment of the network. This information is used by the response
system to select a suitable response for predicted future intrusions. The possible responses that
can be implemented using these cluster output is discussed in section 5.2.1.
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Table 4.16: Alert cluster output of DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2.
Outside Network IP Address Inside Network IP Range Alert Category Alert Type
1 199.95.209.99 172.16.116.0/24 trojan-activity ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95)
2 207.25.71.141, 207.25.71.142, 172.16.116.0/24 trojan-activity ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95)
207.25.71.30, 207.25.71.200
3 172.16.115.20* 172.16.112.0/24 attempted-recon portscan: UDP Portsweep ,
(* inside host) portscan: UDP Filtered Portsweep
4 172.16.115.20* 172.16.114.0/24 attempted-user PROTOCOL-DNS TMG Firewall Client
(* inside host) long host entry exploit attempt
5 208.2.188.61, 204.71.242.42, 172.16.116.0/24 trojan-activity ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95) or
204.248.150.136, 139.72.190.50, ET INFO Exectuable Download from
208.240.89.202, 151.193.131.161, dotted-quad Host
209.1.224.190, 199.173.162.18,
205.252.248.98, 209.67.29.11
6 206.79.171.51, 206.39.184.2 172.16.116.194 trojan-activity ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95)
7 199.172.144.24, 209.1.224.15 172.16.113.0/24 unknown http inspect: MESSAGE WITH INVALID
CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE or
http inspect: NO CONTENT-LENGTH OR TRANSFER-
ENCODING IN HTTP RESPONSE
8 197.218.177.69 172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.112.0/24 sdf sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses
sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded
9 192.254.26.2 172.16.112.0/24 unknown http inspect: MESSAGE WITH INVALID
CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE or
http inspect: NO CONTENT-LENGTH OR TRANSFER
ENCODING IN HTTP RESPONSE
10 206.62.132.69 172.16.113.0/24 unknown http inspect: MESSAGE WITH INVALID
CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE
11 194.27.251.21 172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.112.0/24 sdf sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses
sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded
12 199.172.144.24 172.16.116.194 trojan-activity ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95)
13 194.7.248.153, 204.248.150.136 172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.112.0/24, sdf sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses
172.16.116.0/24 sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded
14 134.205.131.26, 164.214.2.61, 172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.113.0/24, unknown http inspect: MESSAGE WITH INVALID
192.225.36.9, 205.128.215.70, 172.16.115.0/24, 172.16.116.0/24 CONTENT-LENGTH OR CHUNK SIZE or
205.181.112.114, 205.181.112.65, http inspect: NO CONTENT-LENGTH
205.181.112.72, 205.181.112.74, OR TRANSFER-ENCODING IN HTTP RESPONSE
205.252.248.98, 216.40.24.2
15 195.115.218.108 172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.113.0/24 sdf sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses
sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded
16 197.182.91.233 172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.113.0/24, sdf sensitive data: sensitive data - eMail addresses
172.16.114.0/24 sensitive data: sensitive data global threshold exceeded
17 209.185.151.128, 209.185.151.129 172.16.116.194 trojan-activity ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95)
209.3.209.166
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Discussion and Future Work
Usage of computer based applications is becoming increasingly necessary within the society.
The rapid development of service automation and social networking increases human activities
in cyberspace. Illegal activities such as unauthorized data access, data theft, data modification
and various other intrusion activities have been growing rapidly during last decade. While in-
trusion detection techniques have emerged as a solution for network intrusions, the detection
by itself is not sufficient. Automated advanced intrusion detection and response systems are
required to provide real-time protection to current computer systems and networks
The objective of this thesis is to predict future network intrusions. Intrusion alerts gener-
ated by intrusion detection systems are used to learn strategies of attackers. This knowledge
is utilized by the proposed prediction module for future intrusion prediction. Most of the pre-
vious intrusion prediction methods mainly focused on prediction of either alert type or alert
category. However, the proposed module is focused on predicting a set of alerts attributes.
Alert clustering concept is used to achieve this task. Source IP address, destination IP address,
alert type and alert category attributes are used to cluster alerts. For a given alert sequence
of A1, A2, . . . , At, . . . , AT sequence of clusters CA1,CA2, . . . ,CAt, . . . ,CAT is generated by the
alert clustering module. Then the alert prediction module predicts future cluster (CAT+1) based
on the input sequence. Alert cluster prediction results are forwarded to an intrusion response
module, which selects and executes suitable responses for future intrusions.
88
5.1. Conclusion 89
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, a hidden Markov method based alert prediction framework is proposed. Alert
clustering is employed to group selected alert attributes together. A given sequence of alerts
is converted to a sequence of alert clusters and then a hidden Markov model is used to predict
future alert clusters based on the input. The proposed algorithm also provides the alert category
as well as the source IP address, the destination IP address, and the alert type, which are critical
in responding to the intrusion.
Most of the research activities related to intrusion activity prediction are focused on predicting
next possible step only. In this thesis, multiple steps are predicted. Results indicate that, one
step prediction achieved the highest prediction accuracy of 67%, 77% and 81% for αL1, αL2
and αL3 respectively, while five step prediction achieved the lowest with 53%, 65% and 77%
for αL1, αL2 and αL3 respectively.
When comparing graphs based intrusion prediction methods with a sequential series based
prediction algorithm such as the one proposed in this thesis, graph based method has following
limitations:
• The prediction depends on the availability of an attack graph library.
• It requires matching the observed intrusion sequence with all attack graphs in the library
to find a matching attack graph, which may increase computational cost of the prediction
process.
Based on the results, it is observed that a smaller number of clusters tend to improve predic-
tion accuracy. The maximum value of αL3 was 88% for 5 clusters and the lowest 31% was
recorded for 50 clusters. When the number of clusters are smaller, it results in a smaller set of
unique symbols for the HMM model which improves the learning abilities of the HMM model
compared to a larger symbol size. However, when the number of clusters are smaller, it will
hinder the separation of unique alert types and cause merging of two or more alert types. As
an example, in the DARPA data set, there are nine unique alerts categories generated by Snort
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IDS. Therefore, if the number of clusters are less than nine, then one alert cluster may include
more than one alert category which hinders the prediction.
Also, the experimental results indicated that when the number of hidden states are lower than
the number of observations (i.e. when the number of observations are 10 and the number of
hidden states are between 2 to 4), level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1) is lower compared to higher
number of hidden states (i.e. number of hidden states are between 5 to 8). It is observed that
the maximum αL1 difference was 24% for these two scenarios. This shows that that when the
number of hidden states are low, it may not be possible to model the system states changes effi-
ciently because not enough states are available to represent state transition during a multi-stage
intrusion scenario.
There are still some challenges that need to be addressed in the proposed alert prediction frame-
work. They include increasing the prediction accuracy with the increase of cluster size and
predicting intrusion types that not present in the training data set. Currently it is not possible
to predict an intrusion type if that not present in the training data set. Another challenge is
identifying false alerts and misleading intrusion actions generated by the attacker in order to
mislead intrusion detection systems. Some possible solution for these problems are discussed
in the next section.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Intrusion Response
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) generate alerts once they detect network intrusions. These
alerts can then be used as an input to intrusion prediction systems to understand strategies of
attacker and predict future network intrusions. By identifying future steps of attacker, suit-
able response actions can be identified to mitigate future intrusions. Selecting a response is a
complex process requiring assessment of risk of an intrusion, cost of a response and response
execution procedure before selecting a response. Developing such as sophisticated response
system is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to illustrates the usage of alert prediction,
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basic response actions that may be executed based on prediction results are discussed below.
Table 5.1 illustrates few response actions that may be executed for intrusions present in DARPA
LLDOS 2.0.2. These response actions are proposed only to illustrate how prediction output can
be utilized in the process of response action execution. In practice, response actions are much
complex than this and response actions are not just selected only considering intrusion activity.
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Table 5.1: Response actions for alert produced by DARPA LLDOS 2.0.2.
Alert Type (alert signature) Alert Category (signature class) Proposed Response Action
1 portscan: UDP Filtered Portsweep attempted-recon Block traffic from originator or
2 portscan: UDP Portsweep attempted-recon Route originator traffic to honey pot for further analyze
3 portscan: TCP Portsweep attempted-recon of originator behavior
4 portscan: ICMP Filtered Sweep attempted-recon
5 portscan: TCP Distributed Portscan attempted-recon
6 PROTOCOL-DNS TMG Firewall attempted-user Block originator traffic,
Client long host entry exploit attempt Temporally lock host table (to avoid modification)
7 ET POLICY Inbound Frequent Emails - misc-activity Block email traffic originated from sender IP address
Possible Spambot Inbound
8 ET POLICY Executable and linking policy-violation Isolated Host from network,
format (ELF) file download Run System virus scan process to remove agent
that originates file download process
9 ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95) trojan-activity Isolated Host from network,
Improve host virus protection to improve security,
Run System virus scan process to remove trojan agent
10 ET INFO Executable Download trojan-activity Isolated Host from network,
from dotted-quad Host Improve host virus protection to improve security,
Run System virus scan process to remove trojan agent
As an example, consider a case where the prediction module has predicted the next possible
cluster as cluster ID 1 which has following alerts attributes as shown in table 4.16:
Outside Network IP address: 199.95.209.99, Inside Network IP range: 172.16.116.0/24
Alert Class: trojan-activity, Alert Type: ET MALWARE User-Agent (Win95).
By analyzing prediction output, originator IP address and destination IP address (or range) can
be identified by the response system. Since next attack step of attacker is “trojan activity”,
then attacker may download executable code or software to the destination hosts to start a
trojan activity. Therefore, response actions such as “improve virus protection of host nodes”,
“temporally isolated hosts nodes from network” and “run virus scan to identify trojan related
software or codes” can be executed by the response system in order to prevent future intrusion
activities.
5.2.2 HMM Training Process
Behavior of attackers depend on many factors such as network topology, operating systems
running on hosts, services running on the network and geographical location of networks, etc.
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Therefore, prediction module should be able to adapt to different conditions and networks. If
the prediction module heavily depends on domain knowledge and specific scenario knowledge
(such as attack graphs based prediction methods), it will not be able to adapt to different condi-
tions. Hence it is important to develop an alert prediction module which is capable of operating
under different conditions and networks.
Alert prediction module proposed in this thesis is not dependent on specific domain knowl-
edge. Instead, it depends on a training process. Hence this module is capable of adapting to
different environments. In order to gain efficient and best training process, a honey pot network
may be used to train the proposed alert prediction module. A honey pot network is a network
with decoy computer resources, which is set up for the purpose of being probed, attacked and
potentially exploited [121].
Different intrusion scenarios have different intrusion patterns. Therefore, training a hidden
Markov module which can adapt to multiple intrusion scenarios is a challenging task. In order
to adapt to multiple scenarios, multiple HMM modules may be employed. Each HMM module
may be trained based on different set of intrusion scenarios. Then, for a given input intrusion
alerts sequence, suitable HMM module may be selected based on their likelihood value. A
HMM model with the highest likelihood value will be the most suitable model that represents
the behavior of the input intrusion alerts sequence.
5.2.3 Alert Clustering Process
The objective of alert clustering is to group alerts which have similar characteristics. HMM
prediction results indicated that, lesser number of clusters improves prediction accuracy. The
maximum value of αL3 was 88% for 5 clusters and the lowest 31% was recorded for 50 clusters.
However, αL3 remains over 70% for up to 30 clusters. Even though a smaller number of
clusters tend to improve prediction accuracy, this has a significant disadvantage. When number
of clusters are reduced, it decreases the separation between alert clusters and that will result
in meaning less clustering (i.e. alerts are clustered without clear separation). One possible
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solution to this problem is to develop a distributed prediction model with multiple HMMs. Let
number of clusters per one system to be x. If total number clusters are k and then k/x number of
distributed system can be used. Clusters generated by alert clustering module will be divided
to relevant distributed system based on cluster ID range, where each distributed segment is
responsible for handling a range of clusters.
5.2.4 Effect of Noise and False Alerts
The performance of alert prediction framework depends on intrusion alerts generated by intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs). If intrusion detection system failed to detect some important
intrusion activities, then it will affect the performance of prediction module. In addition, IDSs
can also produce false alerts. Also, false activities (noise) can be generated by attackers to
disturb intrusion detection and prediction process. The proposed HMM alert framework uses
intrusion alerts as observations of HMM. In hidden Markov model, probability of an observa-
tion depends on corresponding hidden state. This makes the proposed algorithm more robust
to noise and false alerts.
5.2.5 IRS Feedback Loop
Intrusion prediction output is sent into response module to assist response selection process.
Future research on coupling the prediction module and response module may offer abilities to
generate better responses. In some scenarios, a response action that is executed by a response
system may be able to stop an intrusion. In such a case, parameters of the prediction module
may be updated based on response actions. The proposed HMM based alert prediction module
is capable of achieving this because in a HMM, every state has observation emission probability
for each observation. If some observations are not possible, this probability distribution matrix
may be updated to match new conditions.
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Appendix A
Hidden Markov Model
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is stochastic model which was introduced in late 1960s
by Baum and his colleagues [17], [18]. Due to rich mathematical structure, hidden Markov
models are widely applied in real world applications such as speech recognition, handwriting
recognition, gesture recognition, intrusion detection, speech tagging and bioinformatics.
A hidden Markov model is used to model sequential of observations that can be observed over
the time. Also there are underlying state sequences which are not observed, that produce these
observations. These states are defined as hidden states. As an example, we can consider rainy,
cloudy, stormy and sunny as observations and high, medium and low atmospheric pressure
as hidden states which we cannot observe. Figure A.1 shows an example of hidden Markov
model showing weather conditions with state transition probabilities and observation emission
probabilities. As an example, state transition probability from pressure high to pressure low is
0.3. The sunny observation has 0.4 emission probability in pressure high state and 0.3 emission
probability in pressure low state.
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Figure A.1: An Example of Hidden Markov Model Showing Weather Condition.
Hidden Markov model holds following basic properties.
1. Markov chain property. There are finite number of states in the system where next state
depends on the previous state of the system.
2. After state is changed, observation output is produced based on the observation proba-
bility distribution of that state.
• Elements of the Hidden Markov Model
Elements of the HMM can be described as:
1. N, Number of hidden states in the system.
Where individual states are denoted as S = S 1, S 2, . . . , S N and state at time t denote as
qt.
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2. M, Number of distinct observation symbols per state.
Where individual symbols are denoted as V = v1, v2, . . . , vM.
3. State Transition Probability (A) NxN matrix.
Where ai j represents the state transition probability form state i to state j.
ai j = P(qt+1 = S j|qt = S i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ N.
A =

a11 a12 . . . a1N−1 a1N
a21 a22 . . . a2N−1 a2N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aN1 aN2 . . . aNN−1 aNN

.
4. Observation emission probability (B) NxM matrix.
Where kth observation emission probability of the state j is represented by b j(k).
b j(k) = P(vk at t|qt = S j), where 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M.
B =

b11 b12 . . . b1N−1 b1M
b21 a22 . . . b2N−1 b2M
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bN1 bN2 . . . bNN−1 bNM

.
5. Initial state probability distribution (pi).
Where pi represents the initial states probability of the system.
pii = P(q1 = S i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
pi =
[
pi1 pi2 . . . piN−1 piN
]
.
6. Observation sequence (O).
The observation sequence of length T is represented as O = O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT ,
Where Ot is one of observation symbol from V.
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Hidden Markov Model is typically represented by using A, B and pi parameters and
model is denoted as λ = (A, B, pi).
A.1 Three Basic Problems of the Hidden Markov Model
There are three basic problems that associate with hidden Markov model [97].
1. Evaluation. When hidden Markov model (pi) and observation sequence (O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT )
is given how we compute the probability of observation sequence P(O|λ) ?
2. Decoding. When hidden Markov model and observation sequence (O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT )
is given how we find optimal hidden state sequence that explains the observation se-
quence (Q = q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . , qT )?
3. Hidden Markov Model Learning. When observation sequence is given how do we find
hidden Markov model parameters that maximize probability of observation sequence
P(O|λ)?
1. Solution to Problem 1. The Forward Algorithm.
Consider HMM λ = (A, B, pi) and observation sequence (O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT ) is given,
we want to calculate the probability of observation sequence. Let hidden state sequence
is Q = q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . , qT .
Forward algorithm defines forward variable αt(i) as:
αt(i) = P(O1,O2, . . . ,Ot, . . . ,OT , qt = S i|λ). (A.1)
αt(i) can be compute recursively as:
Step 1. Initialization- Calculate α1(i):
α1(i) = pii bi (O1), 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (A.2)
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Step 2. Induction- Calculate αt+1( j):
αt+1( j) =
[ N∑
i=1
αt(i) ai j
]
b j (Ot+1), 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (A.3)
Step 3. Termination- Calculate P(O|λ):
P(O|λ) =
N∑
i=1
αT (i). (A.4)
The forward algorithm required only N2T multiplications.
2. Solution to Problem 2. The Viterbi Algorithm The Viterbi algorithm is used to find the
single best hidden sequence for given observation with a hidden Markov model. The
other method of finding best hidden state sequence is forward-backward algorithm, it
finds the best hidden state at each step, but the problem of this approach is in some cases
this may not be the best hidden state sequence, since there are possibilities that transition
from one state to another state is invalid (if ai j = 0 then there is no transition from state i
to state j). The Viterbi algorithm define value vt( j) as:
vt( j) = max
q1,q2,....,qt−1
P[q1, q2, ...., qt−1, qt = j,O1,O2, ....,Ot|λ]. (A.5)
vt( j) is the best score along the single path at time t, for a given state qi at time t-1 the
value of the vt( j) can be compute as:
vt( j) = max
i=1,2,...,N
[vt−1(i) ai j] b j(Ot). (A.6)
We need to maximize this value (vt( j)) for each value of t and j, we can do it by finding
the maximum value of vt( j) over all possible previous states.
Steps of the Viterbi algorithm defined as:
Step 1. Initialization:
v1( j) = pii bi(O1), f or 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (A.7)
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ψ1( j) = 0. (A.8)
Step 2. Recursion:
vt( j) = max
1≤i≤N
[
vt−1( j) ai j
]
b j(Ot), f or 2 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (A.9)
ψt( j) = argmax
1≤i≤N
[
vt−1( j) ai j
]
, f or 2 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ j ≤ N. (A.10)
Step 3. Termination: The best score:
P∗ = max
1≤i≤N
[vt(i)]. (A.11)
The start of back trace:
q∗T = argmax
1≤i≤N
[vt(i)]. (A.12)
The state sequence (backtracking):
q∗t = ψt+1 (q
∗
t+1), f or t = T − 1,T − 2, ...., 1. (A.13)
3. Solution to Problem 3. BaumWelch Algorithm.
The most difficult problem of hidden Markov model is the training process, where we
need to find model parameters A, B, pi for a given observation sequence. Assuming we
know the hidden state sequence for a given observation, we can compute state change
probability by considering the maximum likelihood as:
ai j =
Total number of transition from state i to j
Total number of transition from state i to any state
.
But we cannot directly compute this because we don’t know which hidden state that we
are in. So Baum-Welch algorithm uses iteration and re-estimation process to find model
parameters. We define variable backward probability (β) as:
βt(i) = P(Ot+1, . . . ,OT |qt = S i, λ). (A.14)
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β can be find using recursively using following steps,
Step 1. Let βT ( j) = 1, for j = 0, 1, 2, ...., N.
Step 2. Compute βt( j) as:
βt(i) =
N∑
j=1
αt(i) ai j b j(Ot+1) βt+1( j), For t = T − 1, T − 2, ...., 0 and j = 0, 1, ...., N.
(A.15)
Define γt( j) which represents the probability of being in a state S i at time t,
γt( j) = P(qt = S j|O, λ); f or 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ j ≤ N. (A.16)
Where α gives the relevant probability up to time t and β gives the probability after time
t. We can express γ as:
γt( j) =
αt( j) βt( j)
P(O|λ) =
αt( j) βt( j)∑N
j=1 αt( j) βt( j)
. (A.17)
Probability of transfer from state S i (at time t) to S j (at time t+1) is defined as ξt(i, j).
Then ξt(i, j) can be calculated as:
ξt(i, j) =
αt(i) ai j b j(Ot+1) βt+1( j)
P(O|λ) . (A.18)
From the definition of γt(i) and ξt(i, j), we can find the relationship between them as:
γt(i) =
N∑
j=1
ξt(i, j). (A.19)
From the definition of γt(i) and ξt(i, j), HMM model parameters (A, B, pi) can be estimate
as:
Let number of hidden states in the system = N and number of distinct observation sym-
bols per state = M.
Expected value of initial probability(pˆi).
pˆi =
[
pˆi1 pˆi2 . . . pˆiN−1 pˆiN
]
.
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Where pˆii = γ1(i) , for i = 1, 2, ..., N.
State transition probability matrix (A) can be calculated as:
aˆi j =
Expected total number of transition from state S itoS j
Expected total number of transition from state S i to any state
. (A.20)
aˆi j =
∑T−1
t=1 ξt(i, j)∑T−1
t=1 γt(i)
, f or i = 1, 2, ..., N and j = 1, 2, ..., N. (A.21)
Observation emission probability (B) can be calculated as:
bˆ j(k) =
Expected total number of time in state S j and observing symbol vk
Expected total number of times in state S j
. (A.22)
bˆ j(k) =
T∑
t=1
Ot=vk
γt( j)
/ T∑
t=1
γt( j), f or i = 1, 2, ..., N and k = 1, 2, ..., M. (A.23)
Re-estimation process:
Step 1. Initialized model with best guess values for A, B and pi.
Step 2. Compute αt(i), βt(i), ξt(i, j) and γt(i).
Step 3. Re-estimate the model λ = (A, B, pi).
Step 4. If P(O|λ) increases (higher than given threshold value), go to step 2, otherwise
stop the process.
A.2 Hidden Markov Model Scaling Issues
It can be observed that with the increment of the T, αt(i) tends to approach to zero exponentially
(since both A and B contains probability values. So many numbers of multiplication of ai j and
b j become zero), this result in underflow of HMM calculations. To avoid the underflow, a
scaling factor is introduced for the calculation of αt(i) and βt(i). Value of αt(i) and βt(i) are
normalized during the iteration process to avoid these values becoming zero. All equations
involved in the process of calculating αt(i) and βt(i) need to be modified with scaling factor.
More information about this modification is available in the Rabiner HMM tutorial paper [97].
Appendix B
Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID)
The Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) is a publicly available labeled dataset which
was developed based on real traces of both normal and intrusion activities of an 802.11 Wi-Fi
network under the supervision of University of the Aegean and George Mason University [73].
Each record of the AWID dataset is classified as either normal or a specific intrusion type (i.e.,
class attribute of a record is referred to a type of intrusion or normal network activity). The
intrusion types include in the AWID datasets are shown in table B.1 [73]. Description about
these attributes (features) can be found in [119]. The attributes (features) include in the AWID
datasets are shown in table B.2 [73].
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Table B.1: The intrusion types include in the AWID datasets [73].
No Intrusion Description
1 Amok An Increased numbers of 802.11 Authentication Requests is noticed in Amok
2 Arp It may be used as a first step for any of the Key cracking attacks
3 Authentication request 802.11 DoS Attack
4 Beacon 802.11 DoS Attack
5 Cafe latte 802.11 Keystream Retrieving Attacks
6 Chop chop 802.11 Keystream Retrieving Attacks
7 Cts 802.11 DoS Attack
8 Deauthentication 802.11 DoS Attack
9 Deauthentication 802.11 DoS Attack
10 Disassociation 802.11 DoS Attack
11 Evil twin 802.11 Man-in-the-Middle
12 Fragmentation 802.11 Keystream Retrieving Attacks
13 Hirte 802.11 Keystream Retrieving Attacks
14 Power saving 802.11 DoS Attack
15 Probe request 802.11 DoS Attack
16 Probe response 802.11 DoS Attack
17 Rts 802.11 DoS Attack
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Table B.2: The attributes (features) in the AWID datasets [73].
ID Attribute
1 frame.interface id
2 frame.dlt
3 frame.offset shift
4 frame.time epoch
5 frame.time delta
6 frame.time delta displayed
7 frame.time relative
8 frame.len
9 frame.cap len
10 frame.marked
11 frame.ignored
12 radiotap.version
13 radiotap.pad
14 radiotap.length
15 radiotap.present.tsft
16 radiotap.present.flags
17 radiotap.present.rate
18 radiotap.present.channel
19 radiotap.present.fhss
20 radiotap.present.dbm antsignal
21 radiotap.present.dbm antnoise
22 radiotap.present.lock quality
23 radiotap.present.tx attenuation
24 radiotap.present.db tx attenuation
25 radiotap.present.dbm tx power
26 radiotap.present.antenna
27 radiotap.present.db antsignal
28 radiotap.present.db antnoise
ID Attribute
29 radiotap.present.rxflags
30 radiotap.present.xchannel
31 radiotap.present.mcs
32 radiotap.present.ampdu
33 radiotap.present.vht
34 radiotap.present.reserved
35 radiotap.present.rtap ns
36 radiotap.present.vendor ns
37 radiotap.present.ext
38 radiotap.mactime
39 radiotap.flags.cfp
40 radiotap.flags.preamble
41 radiotap.flags.wep
42 radiotap.flags.frag
43 radiotap.flags.fcs
44 radiotap.flags.datapad
45 radiotap.flags.badfcs
46 radiotap.flags.shortgi
47 radiotap.datarate
48 radiotap.channel.freq
49 radiotap.channel.type.turbo
50 radiotap.channel.type.cck
51 radiotap.channel.type.ofdm
52 radiotap.channel.type.2ghz
53 radiotap.channel.type.5ghz
54 radiotap.channel.type.passive
55 radiotap.channel.type.dynamic
56 radiotap.channel.type.gfsk
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ID Attribute
57 radiotap.channel.type.gsm
58 radiotap.channel.type.sturbo
59 radiotap.channel.type.half
60 radiotap.channel.type.quarter
61 radiotap.dbm antsignal
62 radiotap.antenna
63 radiotap.rxflags.badplcp
64 wlan.fc.type subtype
65 wlan.fc.version
66 wlan.fc.type
67 wlan.fc.subtype
68 wlan.fc.ds
69 wlan.fc.frag
70 wlan.fc.retry
71 wlan.fc.pwrmgt
72 wlan.fc.moredata
73 wlan.fc.protected
74 wlan.fc.order
75 wlan.duration
76 wlan.ra
77 wlan.da
78 wlan.ta
79 wlan.sa
80 wlan.bssid
81 wlan.frag
82 wlan.seq
83 wlan.bar.type
84 wlan.ba.control.ackpolicy
ID Attribute
85 wlan.ba.control.multitid
86 wlan.ba.control.cbitmap
87 wlan.bar.compressed.tidinfo
88 wlan.ba.bm
89 wlan.fcs good
90 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.ess
91 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.ibss
92 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.cfpoll.ap
93 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.privacy
94 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.preamble
95 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.pbcc
96 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.agility
97 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.spec man
98 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.short slot time
99 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.apsd
100 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.radio measurement
101 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.dsss ofdm
102 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.del blk ack
103 wlan mgt.fixed.capabilities.imm blk ack
104 wlan mgt.fixed.listen ival
105 wlan mgt.fixed.current ap
106 wlan mgt.fixed.status code
107 wlan mgt.fixed.timestamp
108 wlan mgt.fixed.beacon
109 wlan mgt.fixed.aid
110 wlan mgt.fixed.reason code
111 wlan mgt.fixed.auth.alg
112 wlan mgt.fixed.auth seq
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ID Attribute
113 wlan mgt.fixed.category code
114 wlan mgt.fixed.htact
115 wlan mgt.fixed.chanwidth
116 wlan mgt.fixed.fragment
117 wlan mgt.fixed.sequence
118 wlan mgt.tagged.all
119 wlan mgt.ssid
120 wlan mgt.ds.current channel
121 wlan mgt.tim.dtim count
122 wlan mgt.tim.dtim period
123 wlan mgt.tim.bmapctl.multicast
124 wlan mgt.tim.bmapctl.offset
125 wlan mgt.country info.environment
126 wlan mgt.rsn.version
127 wlan mgt.rsn.gcs.type
128 wlan mgt.rsn.pcs.count
129 wlan mgt.rsn.akms.count
130 wlan mgt.rsn.akms.type
131 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.preauth
132 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.no pairwise
133 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.ptksa replay counter
134 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.gtksa replay counter
135 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.mfpr
136 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.mfpc
137 wlan mgt.rsn.capabilities.peerkey
138 wlan mgt.tcprep.trsmt pow
139 wlan mgt.tcprep.link mrg
140 wlan.wep.iv
141 wlan.wep.key
142 wlan.wep.icv
143 wlan.tkip.extiv
144 wlan.ccmp.extiv
145 wlan.qos.tid
146 wlan.qos.priority
147 wlan.qos.eosp
148 wlan.qos.ack
149 wlan.qos.amsdupresent
150 wlan.qos.buf state indicated
151 wlan.qos.bit4
152 wlan.qos.txop dur req
153 wlan.qos.buf state indicated
154 data.len
155 class
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Table B.3: The selected attributes (features) in the AWID datasets for the exeperiments.
ID Attribute
1 data len
2 frame cap len
3 frame dlt
4 frame interface id
5 frame len
6 frame marked
7 frame offset shift
8 frame time delta
9 frame time delta displayed
10 frame time epoch
11 frame time relative
12 radiotap antenna
13 radiotap channel freq
14 radiotap channel type 2ghz
15 radiotap channel type 5ghz
16 radiotap channel type cck
17 radiotap channel type dynamic
18 radiotap channel type gfsk
19 radiotap channel type gsm
20 radiotap channel type half
21 radiotap channel type ofdm
22 radiotap channel type passive
23 radiotap channel type quarter
24 radiotap channel type sturbo
25 radiotap channel type turbo
26 radiotap datarate
27 radiotap dbm antsignal
28 radiotap flags badfcs
29 radiotap flags cfp
30 radiotap flags datapad
31 radiotap flags fcs
32 radiotap flags frag
33 radiotap flags preamble
34 radiotap flags shortgi
35 radiotap flags wep
36 radiotap length
37 radiotap mactime
38 radiotap pad
39 radiotap present ampdu
40 radiotap present antenna
ID Attribute
41 radiotap present channel
42 radiotap present db antnoise
43 radiotap present db antsignal
44 radiotap present db tx attenuation
45 radiotap present dbm antnoise
46 radiotap present dbm antsignal
47 radiotap present dbm tx power
48 radiotap present ext
49 radiotap present fhss
50 radiotap present flags
51 radiotap present lock quality
52 radiotap present mcs
53 radiotap present rate
54 radiotap present rtap ns
55 radiotap present rxflags
56 radiotap present tsft
57 radiotap present tx attenuation
58 radiotap present vendor ns
59 radiotap present vht
60 radiotap present xchannel
61 radiotap rxflags badplcp
62 radiotap version
63 wlan ba control ackpolicy
64 wlan duration
65 wlan fc order
66 wlan fc type
67 wlan fc version
68 wlan frag
69 wlan mgt ds current channel
70 wlan mgt fixed auth alg
71 wlan mgt fixed beacon
72 wlan mgt fixed capabilities agility
73 wlan mgt fixed capabilities apsd
74 wlan mgt fixed capabilities del blk ack
75 wlan mgt fixed capabilities dsss ofdm
76 wlan mgt fixed capabilities ibss
77 wlan mgt fixed capabilities imm blk ack
78 wlan mgt fixed capabilities pbcc
79 wlan mgt fixed capabilities preamble
80 wlan mgt fixed capabilities privacy
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81 wlan mgt fixed capabilities radio measurement
82 wlan mgt fixed capabilities short slot time
83 wlan mgt fixed capabilities spec man
84 wlan mgt fixed category code
85 wlan mgt fixed fragment
86 wlan mgt fixed sequence
87 wlan mgt rsn akms count
88 wlan mgt rsn akms type
89 wlan mgt rsn capabilities mfpc
90 wlan mgt rsn capabilities mfpr
91 wlan mgt rsn capabilities no pairwise
92 wlan mgt rsn capabilities peerkey
93 wlan mgt rsn capabilities preauth
94 wlan mgt rsn gcs type
95 wlan mgt rsn pcs count
96 wlan mgt rsn version
97 wlan mgt tcprep link mrg
98 wlan mgt tcprep trsmt pow
99 wlan mgt tim dtim count
100 wlan mgt tim dtim period
101 wlan qos amsdupresent
102 wlan qos bit4
103 wlan qos buf state indicated
104 wlan qos buf state indicated2
105 wlan qos eosp
106 wlan qos priority
107 wlan qos tid
108 wlan qos txop dur req
109 wlan seq
110 wlan wep key
111 class
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